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THE LAW OF UNION DISCIPLINE: WHAT THE
COURTS DO IN FACT
CLYDE W. SUMMERSi"
THE Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 1 marks
a new era in the legal regulation of internal union affairs. Congress has
clearly affirmed the public interest in protecting democratic processes in
unions, and it has explicitly protected union members in the free exercise of
those political rights essential for self-government. Although Congress has
declared the central policy of protecting union democracy and has enunciated
essential rights, it has placed on the courts the responsibility of giving body
and life to those rights. The rights guaranteed by Title I, the Bill of Rights,
are stated in broad terms, and are enforceable through civil suits brought by
union members. The courts must give content to those rights and devise
remedies to make them meaningful. Title IV, regulating union elections, though
more detailed, also contains broad provisions, and again the courts are re-
sponsible for giving them meaning and making them effective.2
Although legislative regulation is new, judicial involvement is not, for state
courts have been adjudicating internal union disputes for more than sixty
years.3 To some degree they have been protecting many of the same rights
now guaranteed by the statute. Senator Kennedy, in opposing inclusion of
a Bill of Rights, argued that broader protection of these rights was already
tProfessor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. 73 Stat. 518, 29 U.S.C._I§ 153, 158-60, 187,401-531 (Supp. 1959).
2. Sections 402-03. Section 402 provides that violations of Title IV may be remedied
through filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor. If he finds probable cause to be-
lieve a violation has occurred, he is required to bring an action in the federal district court
to remedy the violation. Under § 403, this procedure is the exclusive remedy for challeng-
ing an election already conducted. This procedure obviously gives the Secretary of Labor
some practical discretion in determining whether to initiate an action, but the responsibility
for interpreting and applying the statute and for designing the appropriate remedy ultimate-
ly rests on the court.
Title III, on trusteeships, provides as an alternative method of enforcement the filing
of a complaint with the Secretary of Labor. Again, his function is limited to investigating
and bringing suit in the district court. The responsibility for interpreting and enforcing
the law is on the court.
3. See, e.g., People ex rel. Deverell v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 118 N.Y. 101,
23 N.E. 129 (1889) (expulsion) ; Wicks v. Monihan, 130 N.Y. 232, 29 N.E. 139 (1891)
(suspension of local).
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provided by state courts.4 The response was to add section 103 expressly
preserving all existing state rights and remedies. 5 Throughout the statute
other specific provisions retained existing state law,6 and finally section 603 (a)
incorporated a broad catch-all antipreemption clause.7 Federal legislative
protection was thus superimposed on state judicial protection, reinforcing and
not supplanting it.
Careful study of the experience of state courts in handling internal union
cases remains highly important. First, and most obvious, state law has con-
tinued vitality, and at certain points it may provide greater protection to the
union member than the federal law. Even when federal and state rights are
concurrent or overlapping, there may be procedural advantages in pursuing
state remedies or in joining causes of action alleging violations of both state
and federal rights.8 Second, the primary responsibility for giving substantive
meaning to the statute will fall on the federal courts which have had little
experience with internal union cases.9 The breadth of protection which they
4. 105 CONG. REc. 6481-87 (1959). The thrust of Senator Kennedy's argument was
that enactment of a federal Bill of Rights would preempt existing state law and leave union
members with less protection than before.
5. "Nothing contained in this title shall limit the rights and remedies of any member
of a labor organization under any State or Federal law or before any court or other tri-
bunal, or under the constitution and by-laws of any labor organization."
6. Section 306 in Title III, Trusteeships, provides: "The rights and remedies provided
by this title shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies at law or in
equity: Provided, That upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary, the jurisdiction of
the district court over such trusteeship shall be exclusive and the final judgment shall be
res judicata." This was clearly intended to preserve access to existing remedies in state
courts. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1959).
Section 403 gives state law more limited scope in election cases. "No labor organization
shall be required by law to conduct elections of officers with greater frequency or in a
different form or manner than is required by its own constitution or bylaws, except as
otherwise provided by this title. Existing rights and remedies to enforce the constitution
and bylaws of a labor organization with respect to elections prior to the conduct thereof
shall not be affected by the provisions of this title. The remedy provided by this title for
challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive."
7. Section 603 (a). "Except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this Act
shall reduce or limit the responsibilities of any labor organization or any officer, agent,
shop steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or of any trust in which a
labor organization is interested, under any other Federal law or under the laws of any
State, and, except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this Act shall take
away any right or bar any remedy to which members of a labor organization are entitled
under such other Federal law or law of any State."
8. See Summers, The Impact of Landrum-Grlffln in State Courts, 13 ANN. CONF. ON
LABOR, N.Y.U. (1960).
9. During the first year of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, more than thirty suits were brought claiming violations of the Act. All but two were
brought in the federal district courts, and both of those were suits under § 201(c) to ex-
amine union books and records. COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF UNION
ADMINISTRATION, SEcTION OF LABOR RELATIONs LAw, ABA, REPORT (1960). Prior to the
passage of the statute, relatively few internal union cases had been brought in the federal
courts, and many of those had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without any con-
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give to statutorily declared rights will be influenced by their view of the pre-
existing protections under state law. Third, the practical value of substantive
rights depends largely on the procedures and remedies available to enforce
those rights. The experience of state courts, both their successes and their
failures, can provide helpful guides in devising remedies to make the statutory
rights effective.10
The purpose here is to try to provide a better insight into state court hand-
ling of internal union cases, the extent of protection provided to the demo-
cratic process, and the problems confronted in providing effective remedies.
It is based on an intensive study of the cases of one state, New York, which
has almost half of all the reported cases. 1 Not only were all published opinions
analyzed, but in addition court records were searched for unreported cases
during a ten year period; and for each case during this same ten year period
the entire court file was analyzed, including pleadings, affidavits, transcripts,
and all procedural steps from the beginning to the end of the litigation. Law-
yers involved in many of these cases were interviewed to obtain additional
information and their general evaluation of the problems involved. Studying
cases in such depth often reveals that the factual picture before the judge bears
remote resemblance to that reflected in his opinion and suggests unstated
reasons for the particular result. It ultimately provides a new perspective of
the protection actually provided by the state courts.1
2
This paper deals only with union discipline and seeks to determine the pro-
tection afforded individual members by the New York courts in this segment
sideration of the merits. See Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1958) ; 68 YALE
L.J. 1182 (1959).
10. The statute gives the courts wide freedom in tailoring the remedy to meet the
particular needs of the case. For example, both § 102 in the Bill of Rights and § 304(a)
in the Trusteeship title provide that the court shall give "such relief (including injunctions)
as may be appropriate." Section 402 in the Election title specifies the remedies to be applied,
but the court as a practical matter retains substantial freedom.
11. The study was initiated by the Governor's Committee on Improper Labor and
Management Practices, and was continued as a part of a larger study conducted by the
New York Department of Labor. The data collected in that study is used here with the
generous permission of Industrial Commissioner, M. P. Catherwood. The analysis and
evaluation of the data, as well as the conclusions, are solely those of the author.
For a pioneer study of the New York courts in action in internal union disputes,
see Judicial Intervention in Revolts Against Labor Union Leaders, 51 YALE L.J. 1372
(1942). For a study subsidiary to the present one and centering around Fitipaldi v.
Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959), see King, Union Democracy, A
Case Study, 10 Svn. L. Rrv. 311 (1959).
12. Close analysis of the documents in the case files and information provided by law-
yers interviewed both confirm that critical facts influencing the court's decision are often
not stated in the published opinion. Therefore, cases are cited on the basis of facts which
appear as relevant from the entire record, whether those facts appear on the face of the
opinions or not. For this reason, the analysis of particular cases, as well as general
conclusions, differ from the author's earlier studies where he relied on the bare published
opinions. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1049
(1951).
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of internal finion affairs. Although discipline cases commonly arise as a part
of a larger factional fight within the union and must be viewed in this context,
they pose problems quite different from cases in such other areas as union
elections, trusteeship of locals, or fiduciary obligations of union officers. Sepa-
rate discussion helps focus more sharply on the specific problems.
A. JUDICIAL CONCERN IN UNION DISCIPLINE
Discipline is the criminal law of union government.' 3 It is the critical device
for maintaining internal order, enforcing obligations of membership, and com-
pelling adherence to union standards in employment. It strengthens the union
as an effective bargaining representative, and is essential for internal democ-
racy. Discipline may, on the other hand, be used to stifle the democratic
process by punishing those who criticize and retaliating against those who
oppose. 14 The courts, therefore, in reviewing union discipline reach into the
most sensitive area of internal union affairs. Overzealous intervention can
weaken and frustrate unions; judicial timidness or indifference can leave those
who exercise their democratic rights helplessly vulnerable.
The individual member feels the impact of formal discipline in two ways.
First, if he is expelled, he may be discharged under a union shop contract,
his seniority rights destroyed, and in some industries effectively barred from
his trade. This impact is now prohibited by sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2)
of the Taft-Hartley Act, but it is still felt in full force outside the protective
reach of the NLRB.' 5 Second, even though not affected in his employment, the
disciplined individual loses his right to participate in union affairs. He is ex-
cluded from union meetings, barred from union office, and denied the right
to vote.
Courts have not separated these two distinct interests in such discipline
cases, but have declared membership to be a "property" right, an indivisible
entity to be protected in its entirety. In some cases courts have emphasized
the effect of discipline on the individual's employment, but this seems to be
little more than verbal make-weight. 16 Federal protection of employment
13. See Bachman v. Harrington, 52 Misc. 26, 102 N.Y. Supp. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1906),
where this analogy to penal laws was carried to its dryly logical conclusion that adoption
of a new constitution by implication repealed the old one and acted as arrest of judgment
for all violations committed under the old constitution where sentence had not been passed.
14. For general discussion of union disciplinary practices, see Summers, Disciplinary
Powers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 483 (1950) ; TAFT, THE STRUCTURE AND Gov-
ERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS 117-80 (1954).
15. Even within the area of discretionary jurisdiction occupied by the Board, protec-
tion is far from perfect, for subtle discriminations in the assigning of jobs at the hiring
hall or in the handling of grievances are often difficult to prove.
16. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Green, 72 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. 1947). For the dis-
ciplined individual, however, it is a distinct and critical interest, for the member's very fear
of loss of his job represses his exercise of his membership rights. When this fear is realized,




rights has not reduced state judicial protection of membership rights.'7 In
many cases, particularly where those being disciplined were leaders of the
opposition, the union has not expelled the disciplined members but has only
barred them from attending meetings or holding office for a number of years.
In these cases courts have not displayed any less concern or willingness to
intervene, but have protected the individual's enjoyment of full membership
rights.18
The limits which the courts have placed on union discipline seem to have
no relation to the severity of the penalty imposed, but are instead governed
by the conduct which the union has sought to punish and the procedure used
for determining the member's guilt. Defining those limits requires looking
to the legal theories used by the courts to rationalize their role in reviewing
union disciplinary action, but more importantly, it requires looking beyond,
those theories to discover what the courts in fact do-what limits they actually
enforce and what remedies they give to protect the disciplined member.
B. LEGAL THEORIES AND RULES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The underlying legal theory defining the role of the court in internal union
affairs is that the union constitution is a contract between the union and its
members. The Court of Appeals in a classic statement of this rule declared in
Polin v. Kaplan:
The constitution and by-laws of an unincorporated association express
the terms of a contract which define the privileges secured and the duties
assumed by those who have become members. As the contracts may
prescribe the precise terms upon which a membership may be gained,
so may it conclusively define the conditions which will entail its loss.
Thus, if the contract reasonably provides that the performance of certain
acts will constitute a sufficient cause for the expulsion of a member,
and that charges of their performance, with notice to the member, shall be
tried before a tribunal set up by the association, the provision is exclusive,
and the judgment of the tribunal, rendered after a fair trial, that the
member has committed the offenses charged and must be expelled, will
not be reviewed by the regularly constituted courts .... This is not to
say, however, that a court will decline to interfere, if an expulsion has
been decreed for acts not constituting violations of the constitution and
by-laws, and not made expellable offenses thereby, either by terms ex-
17. The New York courts have consistently rejected the argument that the existence
of federal remedies precludes the states from giving protection against improper discipline.
See Bryant v. Curren, 25 L.R.R.M. 2190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) ; Real v. Curran, 285 App.
Div. 552, 138 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1955). This position has now been confirmed by the United
States Supreme Court, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
18. Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959) ; Blek v. Kirk-
man, 242 App. Div. 815, 275 N.Y. Supp. 645 (1934), reversing 148 Misc. 522, 266 N.Y.
Supp. 91 (Sup. Ct. 1933). When the court denies relief, it is for reasons other than lack
of injury to job opportunities. For example, in Cromwell v. Morrin, 91 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup.
Ct. 1949), and Ames v. Dubinsky, 5 Misc. 2d 380, 70 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1947), the
court mentioned the fact that the plaintiffs had not been interfered with in their employ-
ment.
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pressed or implied. In such an instance, the expulsion is not within the
power conferred by the contract. Accordingly, the proceedings will be
set aside and the associate restored to membership. 19
The union constitution defines the conduct for which the member can be
punished, prescribes the procedure for trying him, and specifies the appeals
available within the union. The courts' role is but to enforce the contract.
This illusion of simplicity and judicial passivity, however, quickly disappears
when courts confront the vague terms of discipline provisions. Whatever use-
fulness the constitution may have in providing a guide for deciding other
internal union disputes, it gives little help in defining the limits on union
discipline. In large measure, and particularly in the critical cases, the contract
is what the judges say it is.
1. Judicial Repudiation of Constitutional Provisions
The contract theory may itself obligate courts to repudiate or rewrite con-
stitutional provisions, for established contract doctrine requires that pro-
visions contrary to public policy be nullified. In Madden v. Atkins, 20 union
members who had issued "smear sheets" attacking the incumbent officers
during an election campaign, and had organized an opposition group within the
union to criticize union policies and support candidates, were expelled for
"dual unionism." In holding the expulsion illegal, the Court of Appeals said:
If there be any public policy touching the government of labor unions,
and there can be no doubt that there is, it is that traditionally democratic
means of improving their union may be freely availed of by members
without fear of harm or penalty. And this necessarily includes the right
to criticize current union leadership and, within the union, to oppose such
leadership and its policies. (See Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 284,
supra.) The price of free expression and of political opposition within a
union can not be the risk of expulsion or other disciplinary action.21
Regardless of how explicitly the constitution might prohibit such conduct and
how clear-cut the evidence that it had been violated, the discipline would be
illegal as violating public policy. The court thus uses contract logic to excise
terms of the contract and to protect that which the constitution makes pun-
ishable.22
Rewriting procedural provisions is much more direct and far-reaching.
Trial procedures which deny the basic elements of fairness are "contrary to
19. 257 N.Y. 277, 281-82, 177 N.E. 833, 834 (1931).
20. 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
21. Id. at 293, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 640, 151 N.E.2d at 78.
22. In Schrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, 83, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452, 455 (Sup. Ct. 1948), the
court declared, "Fair criticism is the right of members of a union, as it is the right of every
citizen. A provision of a union constitution which would suppress protests of members
against actions of their officers which such members regarded as improper or opposed to
their best interests, would be illegal and unenforceable." The limits placed by the courts
on conduct which can be punished is discussed in detail at notes 61-142 infra.
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natural justice" and void, even though in accord with the constitution.'3
"[Both] good conscience and law demand, that no member shall be deprived
of his rights and privileges until he has had, notice of the charges and been
given an opportunity to meet them."194 If the constitution does not prescribe
these, the courts will intervene to supply the omission.
5
Provisions describing appellate procedure within the union and requiring
exhaustion before a member may resort to the courts do not normally receive
even this verbal curtsy. They are either wholly ignored or swallowed up in the
courts' own rules requiring exhaustion, and made subject to judicially created
exceptions.26
2. Judicial Interpretation of Constitutional Provisions
The contract theory gives the courts an additional, though more subtle role
in regulating union discipline by placing in them the power to interpret disci-
pline provisions.27 Restrictive interpretations may invalidate, or liberal inter-
pretations may affirm, union disciplinary action; the choice in each case lies
largely with the court, though often the availability of choice is so obscured
that the judge's role appears mechanically neutral. In Gleeson v. Conrad 2 8
members of the opposition political group were expelled for refusing to obey
the orders of the local president. The court ordered reinstatement because
the constitution prohibited only disobedience of the international president.
This simple reading of the words glossed over the fact that the local union
had adopted the international constitution as its own, and that the court
could have as plausibly interpreted it to fit the local union.
Provisions defining punishable offenses commonly include catch-all clauses
which can be stretched to reach any conduct.29 Thus, obtaining admission by
false representation can be punished as action which "tends to injury of the
23. Blek v. Wilson, 145 Misc. 373, 259 N.Y. Supp. 443 (Sup. Ct. 1932), rev'd on other
grounds, 262 N.Y. 253, 186 N.E. 692 (1933).
24. Bricklayers Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y. Supp. 855, 861 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd men.,
198 App. Div. 967, 189 N.Y. Supp. 938 (1921).
25. Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N.Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1919) ; Blek v. Kirk-
man, 242 App. Div. 815, 275 N.Y. Supp. 645 (1934), reversing 148 Misc. 522, 266 N.Y.
Supp. 91 (Sup. Ct. 1931). The procedural standards imposed by the court are discussed
in detail at notes 143-91 infra.
26. The various exceptions and the ways in which they are used by the courts are
discussed in detail at notes 192-291 in!ra.
27. Poi v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931) ; Sciveletti v. Leckie, 4 App.
Div. 2d 773, 165 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1957) ; McCauly v. Hoey, N.Y.L.J., July 26, 1957, p. 5,
col. 8 (Sup. Ct.) ; Robinson v. Dahm, 94 Misc. 729, 159 N.Y. Supp. 1053 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
28. 81 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup. Ct. 1948), modified, 276 App. Div. 861, 93 N.Y.S.2d 667
(1949).
29. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, STUDIES IN PERSONNEL POLICY, No.
150, HANDBOOK OF UNION GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES 65-67 (1955) ; Sum-
mers, supra note 12, at 505-08. If the constitution contains no catchall clause, the courts
may imply one. Thus, in Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931), the court
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members" ;30 stealing company property is "unbecoming and disgraceful con-
duct" ;31 and a foreman who refused to let members work unless they took
less than union scale was expelled as one who endeavors "to create dissension
* . . or... works against the interests and harmony of the United Brother-
hood."'3 2 The courts can not as easily narrow such sweeping clauses by inter-
pretation to invalidate discipline. They have not, however, been wholly
helpless. Insurgent shop stewards who held a rump meeting and refused to
post notices requested by the officers were expelled for "unbecoming conduct."
The court said that since the constitution did not state precisely the offense
of disobeying an officer, this conduct could not be punished.33
If a union uses a more specific charge, the court's power to regulate disci-
pline through skillful interpretati6n is greatly increased. In Polin v. Kaplan 34
union members who brought suit against the officers to recover misappro-
priated funds were charged with resorting to the courts without exhausting
internal appeals. The Court of Appeals closely construed the appeals pro-
visions to find that no internal appeals were available, and therefore no viola-
tion. In another case a member who sought to challenge a union assessment
in court was expelled for "carrying on union business outside of meeting."
These words, said the court, could not be interpreted to include this offense.3 r
Similarly, the courts have narrowed the reach of "slandering an officer," to
protect those whose charges against the officer are substantially true, even
though highly defamatory.3 6
Procedural provisions give the courts flexibility in a different form, for
though they tend to be much more specific, they are often incomplete.3 7 Resolv-
ing ambiguities may occasionally be required,38 but the courts are more often
confronted with distinct gaps which they may fill as they choose. In Schrank
read in an implied power to discipline for disloyalty or acts tending to destruction of the
Union. But see Bricklayers Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y. Supp. 855 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd
mere., 189 N.Y. Supp. 938 (App. Div. 1921).
30. Krause v. Sander, 66 Misc. 601, 603, 122 N.Y. Supp. 54, 55 (Sup. Ct. 1910), af'd,
143 App. Div. 941, 127 N.Y. Supp. 1128 (1911).
31. Austin v. Dutcher, 56 App. Div. 393, 394-95, 67 N.Y. Supp. 819, 820 (1900).
32. Drazen v. Curby, 172 App. Div. 417, 421, 158 N.Y. Supp. 507, 510 (1916).
33. Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed, 269 App. Div.
972, 58 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1945).
34. 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931).
35. Angrisani v. Steam, 167 Misc. 728, 3 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 255 App.
Div. 975, 8 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1938).
36. Shapiro v. Gehlman, 244 App. Div. 238, 278 N.Y. Supp. 705, modified, 269 N.Y.
517, 199 N.E. 515 (1935). For other cases in which the courts have narrowly construed
constitutional provisions to invalidate discipline, see Tesoriero v. Miller, 274 App. Div.
670, 88 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1949) ; Pabon v. Curran, 44 L.R.R.M. 2178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959);
Connell v. Stalker, 21 Misc. 609, 48 N.Y. Supp. 77 (Sup. Ct. 1897).
37. See NATiONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENcE BoARD, op. cit. supra note 26; Summers,
Disciplinary Procedures of Unions, 4 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 15 (1950).
38. See, e.g., Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959);
People ex rel. Schults v. Love, 199 App. Div. 815, 192 N.Y. Supp. 354 (1922).
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v. Brown 39 the president of a local union who distributed a circular protesting
the appointment of a receiver was charged with circulating false and malicious
statements, tried by the convention and expelled. The court held that the
trial was void because no express provision gave the convention power to hear
such charges, and none would be implied even though the convention was the su-
preme governing and judicial body of the union. In a contrasting case a gap
was filled to uphold the fining of a bandleader who cut union scale and sold
jobs. His acquittal by the local trial board was appealed to the international
executive board, which reversed and fixed the penalty. The court held that
although the constitution was silent, the power to convict and punish was
inherent in the appellate power.40 In both of these cases the court could have
as logically drawn the opposite inference from silence.41 Gaps in the consti-
tutional provisions gave the courts an opportunity for choice.
In so far as procedural provisions are detailed and specific, the court may
invalidate discipline by requiring strict compliance, or uphold it by finding
that the defects were unsubstantial or were waived. In Jose v. Savage 42 a
member who accused the officers of misconduct was charged with slandering a
union officer. The court held that the trial board had no jurisdiction because
three of its eleven members had not been elected as required by the constitu-
tion, but had been appointed to fill vacancies occuring after the election. Such
punctiliousness, however, is not always required. The expulsion of a local
president who applied to a rival union for a charter did not need to follow
the letter of the constitution; substantial compliance was enough.43 Similarly,
the court may excuse violations by holding that, by proceeding, the accused
member waived the defect.
44
39. 194 Misc. 138, 86 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
40. Rubens v. Weber, 237 App. Div. 15, 260 N.Y. Supp. 701 (1932).
41. See also Peabody v. Kaufman, 61 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct.), mnodified, 270 App.
Div. 1019, 62 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 796, 71 N.E.2d 770 (1947). The court
held there was no implied power in the appellate tribunal either to find an acquitted mem-
ber guilty or order a new trial for procedural defects.
42. 123 Misc. 283, 205 N.Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
43. Margolis v. Burke, 53 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. 1945). See also Watson v. Victory,
Walter, J., N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, April 15, 1952, it was suggested that the courts
in weighing union procedural defects should use as an analogy the review exercised by
federal courts over state courts in habeas corpus petitions claiming denial of due process
under the fourteenth amendment.
44. Waiver has been largely limited to formal defects in -notice. Strobel v. Irving, 171
Misc. 965, 14 N.Y.S.2d 864 (N.Y. City Munic. Ct. 1939) (lack of written charges, but
accused had actual notice, appeared, and plead .guilty); Belkin v. Spiegel, 3 L.R.R.M. 800
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938) (written notice did not specify the charges, but accused was'informed
orally and refused to accept on adjournment) ; Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N.Y.
Supp. 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1907), aft'd, 124 App. Div. 915, 108 N.Y. Supp. 1133 (1908) (writ-
ten notice was not served, but accused had actual notice and defended on the merits). Even
in such cases, the courts have at times refused to find any waiver and have insisted on
strict compliance. Schmidt v. Rosenberg, 49 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd tnein., 269
App. Div. 685, 54 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1945) (complaining witness was not the one who signed
the charges); Soulounias v. Leondopoulos, 2 L.R.R.M. 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938) (writ-
ten charges were not specific and the accused objected and refused to proceed).
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Even the penalty provisions may give the courts room to regulate discipline
by interpretation. In Scivoletti v. Leckie 4 5 members of the Bartenders Union
who formed an opposition group within the union were charged with dual
unionism, suspended for six months, and barred from holding union office for
two years. After their suspension they asked for reinstatement of their sen-
iority rights but were refused. This, the court said, was imposing an un-
authorized penalty, for the constitution did not list loss of seniority as a
penalty. The court thus found a violation of the constitution justifying judicial
intervention and protection of the disciplined member.
These cases make clear that in discipline cases the contract theory, which
verbally limits the courts to enforcing the union's own rules, in fact gives the
court wide freedom. The union writes the constitution, but the court interprets
it, and the interpretation process here is not confined by the customary limiting
guides. The intent of the parties is unsought, even if discoverable; past prac-
tice is ignored or rejected; and prior court decisions interpreting similar
clauses are not precedents. Within the broad range between a restrictive
reading and an expansive interpretation, between literal conformity and sub-
stantial compliance, the court chooses, case by case. Its choice determines
whether the discipline shall be allowed or enjoined.
One pattern of interpretation is discernable in discipline cases-a tendency
toward a restrictive interpretation which limits discipline. In three-fourths of
the interpretation cases the court chose a narrow construction to invalidate the
discipline. This is not an articulate principle, although the analogy of discipline
to criminal law might point in this direction; nor is the pattern uniform. Liberal
interpretation was used to uphold discipline mainly in cases involving such
offenses as stealing,46 fraud,47 dual unionism,48 cutting union scale,4 9 or mem-
bership in the Communist Party ;5o but in an equal number of cases the courts
have applied restrictive interpretations even to such offenses.Y' What seems
to emerge, apart from other factors, is an unspoken judicial distaste for finion
discipline, and the courts' willingness to use interpretation to curb the union's
power.
45. 148 N.Y.S.2d 50 (Sup. Ct. 1955), modified, 4 App. Div. 2d 773, 165 N.Y.S.2d 529
(1957).
46. Austin v. Dutcher, 56 App. Div. 393, 67 N.Y. Supp. 819 (1900).
47. Krause v. Sander, 66 Misc. 601, 122 N.Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1910), aff'd, 143 App.
Div. 941, 127 N.Y. Supp. 1128 (1911).
48. Margolis v. Burke, 53 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
49. Drazen v. Curby, 172 App. Div. 417, 158 N.Y. Supp. 507 (1916); Rubens v. Weber,
237 App. Div. 15, 260 N.Y. Supp. 701 (1932).
50. Weinstock v. Ladisky, 197 Misc. 859, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
51. Pabon v. Curran, 44 L.R.R.M. 2178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (sale of narcotics);
Real v. Curran, 285 App. Div. 552, 138 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1955) (narcotics); Curatella v.
Heide, Inc., 20 L.R.R.M. 2347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947) (failure to repay money borrowed
from union) ; Schmidt v. Rosenberg, 49 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd mem., 269
App. Div. 685, 54 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1945) (hiring for less than union scale); Connell v.
Stalker, 21 Misc. 609, 48 N.Y. Supp. 77 (Sup. Ct. 1897) (refusing to turn over union
records to special investigating committee of union).
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3. Judicial Review of the Evidence
The courts frequently declare that they will not reweigh the evidence before
the union tribunal, but will look only to see if there is some evidence to support
the finding of guilt. This language, however, is often but an apologetic
prelude to a full re-evaluation of the evidence, justified by a holding that the
findings were "totally unsustained. ' ' 52 Cases in which courts do not in fact
re-evaluate the evidence are almost exclusively those in which there was some
evidence that the disciplined members had Communist ties. Once convinced
of a member's Communist taint, the courts refuse to inquire further into the
union's findings.53 Close examination of all other cases, however, makes clear
that the courts normally reweigh the evidence, substituting their own evalu-
ation of the facts for that of the union tribunal.
In some cases the court may narrowly view evidence or even construe it
away in order to find the charges not proven. In Fittipaldi v. Legassie,5 4 a
member was charged with slandering a union officer in that during a dispute
at a union meeting he said the president was a "G.D. Communist." When
asked to repeat the statement, he said, "This is getting to be a communist
outfit." At the union trial six witnesses stated, when asked, that they heard
him say during a verbal altercation with the president that "this is getting
to be a communist outfit." None was asked or testified about the other
statement. The court held that the record "contains no evidence to sub-
stantiate the charge."55 In another case, members of a local which was in
receivership defied orders by calling a meeting, adopting a constitution, and
electing officers. The court found that this was really not a meeting or an
election, but only an attempt by the local to dramatize its desire for self-
government. There was, therefore, no evidence of disobedience.5 6
One of the difficulties of limiting judicial review to a determination of
whether there is substantial evidence to support the union's findings is that
frequently there is no adequate record of the union proceedings available.57
52. See, e.g., Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576, modified, 4 N.Y.
2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73j_(l97;_ Harmon v. Matthews, 27 N.Y.S.2d 656
(Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Blek v. Wilson, supra note 23; Fritz v. Knaub, supra note 44; Watson
v. Victory, supra note 43. But see MacPherson v. Green, supra note 16. The Court of
Appeals in Madden v. Atkins, supra note 17, did not even make this preliminary apology.
Lip service was given, however, in the concurring opinion.
53. See, e.g., Dakchoylous v. Ernst, 203 Misc. 277, 118 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1952);
aff'd, 282 App. Div. 1101, 126 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1953) ; Ames v. Dubinsky, 5 Misc. 2d 380, 70
N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
54. Supra note 18.
55. Id. at 526, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
56. Koukly v. Canavan, 154 Misc. 343, 277 N.Y. Supp. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (affirmative
holding) ; Koukly v. Weber, 154 Misc. 659, 277 N.Y. Supp. 39 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
57. In Scivoletti v. Leckie, 148 N.Y.S.2d 50, 52 (Sup. Ct. 1955), modified, 4 App. Div.
2d 773, 165 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1957), a stenographic transcript had apparently been made but
it was not introduced into evidence; in Reilly v. Hogan, 32 N.Y.S2d 864 (Sup. Ct.), aft'd,
264 App. Div. 855, 36 N.Y.S2d 423 (1942), the court observed that notes of the union trial
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There may be only cryptic minutes or an obviously incomplete transcript.
Attempts to reconstruct the testimony inevitably lead to hopeless confusion,
and the court must hear the evidence de novo.58 Although the court, after
hearing the evidence de novo might conceivably apply a substantial evidence
rule, there is little incentive and less reason for giving weight to the union's
findings when the court has heard all of the evidence first hand and can not know
what evidence was heard by the union tribunal.
Study of the cases indicates that judges often go far beyond hearing evidence
directly relevant to the charges, and in fact learn of the whole internal prob-
lem of which the discipline is but a part. For example, in Gleeson v. Conrad '9
members who were disciplined for violating an order to turn in their route-
books sought to show in court that they were members of the opposition group,
what had been said by the president when he ordered them to turn in their
books, and the political motivation of the order. The judge overruled the
union's objection that this was irrelevant saying, "We might as well hear
the whole story." In Cromwell v. Morrin 60 local officers were removed from
office and barred from meetings for five years because the local called an un-
authorized strike. The court hearing consisted largely of attempts by the
local officers, on the one hand, to show that the international officers had "sold
out" the local by agreeing to a "soft" contract; the international officers, on
the other hand, sought to show that the local was controlled by Communists.
The courts not only willingly hear such evidence, but it is generally accepted
by almost all lawyers involved in these cases that evidence of the sources of
the underlying dispute is influential, if not crucial, in the decisions of the
courts.
The doctrinal structure, despite the superficial rigidity of the contract theory,
is loose-jointed and flexible in the hands of the courts. The nature of discipline
provisions, as well as the sensitive and vital interests involved, increase this
flexibility, and the courts have used it freely to impose judicial regulation on
union discipline. Within wide limits, it is not the union constitution but the
court which controls. Recognition of this fact presents significant and difficult
questions-What limits do the courts in fact impose on union discipline?
What conduct can the unions punish? And what procedural safeguards must
the union observe?
had 'been "curiously" destroyed; and in Tesoriero v. Miller, supra note 36, the Interna-
tional Executive Board had appointed a commission to investigate the appeal of an expul-
sion, but the commission's report misstated the facts and the appeal was denied.
58. Examination of the record in Madden v. Atkins, supra note 20, shows that
the union trial minutes were hopelessly garbled and a substantial portion of the trial
in the lower court was spent in trying to resolve conflicting testimony as to what evidence
had been presented.
59. Supra note 28. The facts in this case, not contained in the reported opinion, are
derived from the record on appeal.
60. Supra note 18. The facts in this case, not contained in the reported opinion, are
derived from discussions with the principal participants.
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Precise answers to these questions are impossible, for courts commonly
cloak their reasons in doctrinal rationalizations. In addition, courts have
concurrent concerns which may be mingled or confused. Procedural defects
may be used to void discipline for conduct which the court thinks ought not
be punished, or exhaustion may be required partly because the court believes
the discipline is justified. On the other hand, objection to procedural defects
may express a bona fide insistence on regularity and due process, and requir-
ing exhaustion may reflect a real desire to give the union first chance to correct
its own mistakes. Separating these elements and discerning a pattern is ex-
tremely difficult, involving much more intuitive judgment than statistical
analysis. In addition, the pattern is at times torn by unperceptive and rule-
bound judges who never escape wooden doctrinal analysis.
C. PUNISHABLE OFFENSES
The most crucial inquiry in union discipline is determining what conduct the
courts consider punishable, and what conduct they feel should be beyond the
reach of union discipline. Although judges seldom declare explicitly that
certain conduct can or can not be punished, their opinions often carry clues
which betray their attitude toward the substantive offense. By going behind
the opinion one can better see the whole internal dispute as the judge saw it,
and can understand more clearly what factors.may have influenced his decision.
With over one hundred judicial opinions in discipline cases, and with careful
study of the background and entire litigation of thirty-five of these cases, some
patterns begin to emerge which suggest what activities of union members the
courts will shield and what they will leave unprotected.
Offenses for which union members are punished fall largely into six rather
distinct categories which reflect marked differences in judicial response to
union discipline. We are concefned, not with the constitutional clause invoked,
but with the conduct in fact punished, for it is clear that the judges go behind
the charge to the conduct itself. Thus, in Madden v. Atkins 61 the court gave
the protection it felt appropriate for internal political opposition, which was
the root of the discipline, not dual unionism, for which they were charged.
Determining the conduct that is in fact being punished is not always this
simple. For example, in Gleeson v. Conrad,62 though the overt offense was
violating an officer's order, the court may have seen in this discipline the
persecution of political opponents; and in Cromwell v. Morrin 11 the offense
given weight by the court may have been either the unauthorized strike or the
alleged Communist activity. Although this makes precise definition of punish-
able offenses impossible, the cumulative effect of the cases is to provide some
helpful guides and to indicate the relative degree of judicial approval or
disapproval of the various categories of offenses.
61. 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E2d 73 (1958).
62. 276 App. Div. 861, 93 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1949).
63. 91 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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1. Financial Offenses
The courts have freely affirmed the union's power to enforce the payment
of dues and assessments, even to the extent of not using the power of interpre-
tation to prevent the forfeiting of substantial death benefits for minor delin-
quencies in dues.64 In contrast with other offenses, the delinquent member
can be summarily suspended without notice or hearing, although a subsequent
procedure may be required to enable him to show that he was not delinquent
or that the dues were not assessed in accordance with the constitution.65
This favorable judicial attitude toward enforcing financial obligations does
not, however, prevent the courts from looking behind a union's nominal action
to see if strict enforcement of these obligations is being used as a device to
eliminate disliked individuals. 66 Whether the New York courts would go an
additional step of reflecting in their decisions in discipline cases their attitudes
toward the purpose for which union funds were used is not indicated by the
cases.
Discipline for misuse of union funds or other financial corruption is, of
course, judicially accepted, if not favored. Procedural rules are not strictly
construed, nor the exhaustion of remedies requirement readily relaxed, for
those so accused. 67 The weight given to this factor by the courts is quite
limited, for claims of corruption are staples of political debate in internal union
disputes, and litigation often looks like a verbal duel between pots and kettles.
Courts are willing to hear the charges and countercharges, 68 whether relevant
to the case or not, but seem wary of giving them weight except where the
evidence is clear and the corruption is gross.6 9
2. Collective Bargaining Offenses
Unions frequently discipline members for conduct which directly undermines
the union's economic strength or undercuts its working conditions. Courts
64. Simson v. Bugman, 45 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Erie County Ct. 1943); Sammel v. Myrup,
12 N.Y.S.2d 217 (New York Munic. Ct. 1939); Hess v. Johnson, 41 App. Div. 465, 58
N.Y. Supp. 983 (1899). Use of discipline to collect money borrowed from the union may
not be so freely countenanced by the courts. Curatella v. Henry Heide, Inc., 20 L.R.R.M.
2347 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 1947).
65. See Dixon v. Sheridan, 3 App. Div. 2d 831, 161 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1957).
66. McCauly v. Hoey, N.Y.L.J., July 26, 1957, p. 5, col. 8, (Sup. Ct.).
67. Rubens v. Weber, 237 App. Div. 15, 260 N.Y. Supp. 701 (1932) ; Murphy v. Milne,
N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, May 7, 1950, affirming memorandum opinion of Justice Rowe,
N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, July 3, 1956. Bauer v. American Federation of Grain Millers,
N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, 1957. The court enjoined the union from trying a business
agent charged with embezzling $50,000, because the trial was being held before an impartial
third person rather than the union tribunal prescribed by the constitution.
68. In Kennedy v. Milk Drivers, Local 584, File No. 5119/56, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County, May 8, 1956, the court refused to strike affidavits claiming the expelled plaintiff
was an extortioner and racketeer.
69. For a case in which the court explicitly recognized the gross corruption of union
bfficers who were using discipline to silence the opposition, see Dusing v, Nuzzo, 26 N.Y.S.
2d $45 (Sup. Ct, 1941).
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have shown no antagonisms to such discipline, but have upheld penalties for
working during a strike 70 or in a nonunion shop,71 for working for less than
the union scale,72 or for engaging in unauthorized strikes 73 or misconduct on
the job.74 The compliance with the constitution required, and the procedural
standards enforced, in these cases are neither markedly strict nor noticeably
liberal,75 nor does the requirement of exhaustion vary from the average
pattern.
If the union's underlying economic action is illegal, such as preventing the
use of labor-saving machinery, engaging in an illegal secondary boycott, or
striking in breach of contract, discipline of union members to enforce that
collective action would be enjoined. 76 Conceivably, courts in discipline cases
might also be influenced by their general sympathy or lack of sympathy with
the union's underlying activity, even though legal, but there is little evidence
of this in the cases. The nearest to it is Tesoriero v. Miller 77 in which the
court protected a man who was disliked by his fellow workers as an "eager
beaver" and a "company man." When some of them reproached him for
working during a relief period he reported them to the supervisor, and this
led to his expulsion. 78 The court, in voiding the expulsion, looked only to
70. Havens v. King, 221 App. Div. 475, 224 N.Y. Supp. 193 (1927).
71. Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N.Y. 225, 109 N.E. 244 (1915) ; Watson v. Victory, 127
N.Y.L.J. 307 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
72. Rubens v. Weber, 237 App. Div. 15, 260 N.Y. Supp. 701 (1932) ; Drazen v. Curby,
172 App. Div. 417, 158 N.Y. Supp. 507 (1916).
73. Cromwell v. Morrin, 91 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
74. Perez v. Curran, File No. 3144/57, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, 1957 (fighting on
shipboard) ; Austin v. Dutcher, 56 App. Div. 393, 67 N.Y. Supp. 819 (1900) (stealing com-
pany property).
75. In cases in which discipline was upheld, claimed defects varied from minor irregu-
larities to substantial defects. However, in other cases involving violation of work rules,
the court ordered reinstatement because of procedural or other defects, which also varied
from minor to substantial. See People ex rel. Deverell v. Musical Mut. Protective Union,
118 N.Y. 101, 23 N.E. 129 (1889); Schmidt v. Rosenberg, 49 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct.
1944), aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 685, 54 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1945) ; Harmon v. Matthews, 27
N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Bachman v. Harrington, 52 Misc. 26, 102 N.Y. Supp. 406
(Sup. Ct. 1906) ; Shernoff v. Schimel, 112 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sup. Ct. 1952) ; Fuerst v. Musical
Mut. Protective Union, 95 N.Y. Supp. 155 (N.Y. City Ct. 1905); Watson v. Victory,
Memorandum of Walter, J., N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, May 16, 1952. The total body of
cases shows no special pattern of judicial hostility or hospitality to discipline cases in this
category. The cases are erratic, but average.
76. Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941) (enjoining
union from enforcing rule prohibiting members from working where "canned music!' was
used) ; Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N.Y. Supp. 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1907) (reinstating
member who was expelled for refusing to violate contract) ; Republic Aviation v. Republic
Lodge 1987, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 38 L.R.R.M. 2667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (enjoining
discipline of strike breakers in violation of strike settlement agreement which barred re-
prisals).
77. 274 App. Div. 670, 88 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1949).
78. The facts in this case, not reported in the reported opinion, are derived from the
record on appeal.
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the charge of working during rest time and said, "Such cause it seems to us
was so trivial and unimportant as to suggest bad faith on the part of the
union .... "79
3. Dual Unionism
The judicial attitude toward discipline for dual unionism is suggested in
Margolis v. Burke.8 0 A local president who applied for a charter in a rival
union was summarily expelled without notice or hearing by an international
vice-president. Objections to this procedure were brushed aside, the court
stating that the union's action was in substantial compliance with the con-
stitution; and the court declared: "By the very nature of things, such conduct
cannot be denoted honorable or fair. Margolis .. . seeks the aid of equity
to escape the natural consequences of his acts. To permit such escape, a Court
of Equity would, in effect, enthrone in office one recreant in his trust and
condone and approve disloyalty."8' 1 The hands of Margolis were declared
"unclean" and he was entitled to no equitable relief.
This oversimplifies the problem, for support of a rival union may not always
be viewed with such distaste. In the campaign period immediately preceding a
labor board election, support of a challenging union might be judicially sancti-
fied as the exercise of a statutory right and protected from disciplinary curbs.
The New York courts have not confronted this problem and there is no clue
as to how they would respond.
The charge of dual unionism may be used to reach all forms of organized
opposition to union policies and leadership, but the courts have refused to
equate loyalty to the union with loyalty to the incumbent officers. Thus, in
Madden v. Atkins 82 the court protected the right to form an opposition group
within the union, and it was reluctant to construe such conduct as advocacy
of mass withdrawal from the union.8 3 The line between internal opposition
and support of another union, however, can become very indistinct. Thus, in
Lafferty v. Fremd 8 4 the officer of an independent union continued to advocate
affiliation with a C.I.O. union after the union had decided against affiliating.
The court enjoined the disciplinary proceedings on procedural grounds.si
79. 274 App. Div. at 674, 88 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
80. 53 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
81. Id. at 161-62. For a similar attitude, see Reubel v. Lewis, 182 Misc. 30, 43 N.Y.S.
2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1943). However, the court later relented and held that even dual unionists
were entitled to compliance with the constitution and due process. Reubel v. Lewis, 47
N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct.), appeal denied, 293 N.Y. 762, 57 N.E.2d 840 (1944). See also
Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N.Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1919), holding that one
charged with dual unionism could not be expelled without notice and hearing.
82. 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
83. For a similar case, see Scivoletti v. Leckie, 4 App. Div. 2d 773, 165 N.Y.S2d 529
(1957).
84. 36 L.R.R.M. 2674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
85. In Zalnerovich v. Van Ausdal, 65 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 1946), the member
charged with dual unionism claimed that the real basis was his failure to join a particular
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4. Use of the Courts
Many unions have explicit clauses punishing resort to the courts without
first exhausting internal appeals, and others will in fact punish such resort
under less specific provisions. The legality of such discipline has never been
squarely decided in New York, but the cases indicate a judicial hostility to
such interference with access to the courts. In Polin v. Kaplan 8' the Court
of Appeals ordered reinstatement and damages for a member who was disci-
plined for suing to recover funds allegedly misappropriated by the union. The
court not only warped the constitution to find no violation of an explicit
clause, but also said that this was not disloyalty, injurious to the union, or
tending to disruption. It then declared :87
It was the absolute right of the plaintiffs to bring the suit, whether they
could successfully maintain it or not, and they might not be expelled for
having so done.
In Angrisani v. Steam s two brothers were expelled on charges of carrying
on union business out of meeting, one because he sued to enjoin an assessment
he claimed illegal, and the other because he agreed to testify in the suit if
subpoenaed. The court reinstated both, stating that there was a right to bring
the suit even though it could not be sustained, and an even clearer right to
obey a subpoena.
The courts, however, have not uniformly given vigorous protection in this
area.8 9 One court has suggested that the right to use the courts does not
political party. The court refused to rely on this claim to enjoin the union from proceeding
with the hearing.
86. 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931).
87. Id. at 284, 177 N.E. at 835.
88. 167 Misc. 728, 3 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem., 255 App. Div. 975, 8 N.Y.S.
2d 997 (1938); 167 Misc. 731, 3 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inee., 255 App. Div. 975,
8 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1938).
89. In Schrebank v. Kempter, memorandum, Hecht, J., N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County,
Dec. 28, 1949, the court ordered reinstatement of the local secretary because she had given
evidence in court in a suit brought against the officers charging them with dissipating local
funds, and in Shernoff v. Schimel, 28 L.R.R.M. 2377 (Sup. Ct. 1951), the expelled mem-
ber claimed that the discipline was to retaliate for his bringing suit to recover funds he
claimed belonged to the union. The court invalidated the discipline on procedural grounds
without requiring exhaustion of remedies. Several members of a Teamster local who
brought suit for an accounting were expelled. They sued for reinstatement. One suit was
dismissed for failure to exhaust internal remedies, Logan v. Ruehl, memorandum, Larkin,
J., N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, Aug. 18, 1939 (Register 90, p. 1) ; but the court later up-
held the complaint as stating a good cause of action. Petrie v. Ruehl, 22 N.Y.S.2d 549
(Sup. Ct. 1940). Ultimately all of them were reinstated.
In Wilkins v. De Koning, 40 L.R.R.M. 2229 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), the union brought
charges against a member for showing his lawyer a copy of the welfare fund report. The
court enjoined the union from trying him on this charge, saying that his consulting his
lawyer was an exercise of his statutory right to see if a violation of the law had occurred.
It would seem that if a violation was discovered, the member would have at least an equal
right to sue to remedy the violation.
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extend to assisting another financially to bring suit against the union. 90 In some
cases the courts have denied relief because appeals from the discipline have
not been exhausted, 91 or have apparently felt that there were other grounds
which more than justified the union's action.9 2
Some unions provide a more limited penalty: assessing against the member,
if he loses, costs incurred by the union in defending the suit. In Roman v.
Caputo 93 a member who brought a suit that was almost totally devoid of sub-
stance was assessed $714. When he sought temporary injunction against this
assessment the union justified its action on the grounds that the suit was part
of a deliberate plan of harrassment by a left wing faction to paralyze the union.
The court denied the injunction for failure to exhaust internal remedies, thus
avoiding both the factual and substantive issues.94
5. Political Activity Within the Union
A large proportion of the litigated discipline cases have at their roots a
factional fight within the union, and in many it is reasonably apparent that the
discipline is directed toward curbing criticism and political opposition. The
contract theory, woodenly followed, gives no protection against such discipline,
for union constitutions commonly contain provisions circumscribing political
activity in the union. They may prohibit "slandering an officer," "circulating
leaflets without permission," "forming groups or clubs within the union," or
"carrying on union business outside of meeting." Even without such clauses,
90. Stroebel v. Irving, 171 Misc. 965, 14 N.Y.S.2d 864 (N.Y. City Munic. Ct. 1939).
In this case the accused member pleaded guilty at the union trial.
91. See cases cited notes 84-85 supra, and 87 infra.
92. Leaders of an opposition group in Local 584 of the Teamsters who went to the
District Attorney with stories of corruption in the local and who had supported litigation
contesting local elections were expelled. When they sued for reinstatement, the court re-
fused to act because they were enjoying full membership rights and an appeal was pending
before the international executive board. Cunningham v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1955, p. 13 (Sup. Ct.). One whose expulsion was affirmed returned to
court, but the court then treated as relevant allegations by the officers that he was a "crook"
and had a record as a "racketeer." Kennedy v. Milk Drivers, Local 584, File No. 5119/56,
N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, May 8, 1956. He never won reinstatement.
93. 28 L.R.R.M. 2616 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
94. A member who challenged the legality of a referendum and lost in Fritsch v. Rar-
back, 199 Misc. 356, 98 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. 1950), was assessed $211.50 by the union
for costs incurred in defending the suit, when he sought help from the court which had
dismissed the case "without" costs, his motion was denied without opinion, N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
N.Y. County, Jan. 30, 1951. However, when he agreed to withdraw from the opposition
and cooperate with the controlling group in the union, the debt was forgotten.
In another case, Padilla v. Curran, File No. 4524/58, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, 1958,
a leader of an opposition group brought criminal charges against an officer claiming a
brutal assault. When the officer was acquitted, the union assessed $1,546.92 costs of defend-
ing the suit against the complaining member. He sued to enjoin his suspension and to pre-
vent his name from being stricken from the ballot. The court obtained an agreement from
the union not to enforce the fine pending trial of the action and set it for early trial. Prior
to trial, the union agreed to revoke the assessment.
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political opposition may be charged with "creating dissension," "causing dis-
ruption," "bringing the union into disrepute," or "conduct detrimental to the
best interests of the union."
The courts, however, have not proven themselves so wooden. Although they
did not, prior to Madden v. Atkins,95 explicitly declare that freedom of speech
and assembly within the union could not be impaired by union discipline, they
freely manipulated the flexible doctrines to achieve that end.96 Polin v.
Kaplan 97 is itself a classic example. While restating the contract theory and
studiously avoiding any holding that free criticism was beyond the reach of
union discipline, the court shriveled constitutional provisions, ignored signifi-
cant portions of the charges, and refused to accept the union's findings of fact,
all to the end of protecting those who dared to exercise their democratic rights.
Out of forty litigated cases discernably involving discipline for internal political
activity, the courts have voided the discipline in all but ten cases. Inarticulate
the courts have been, insensitive they have not.
Courts' ability to protect freedom of speech and assembly by indirection is
aided by the tendency of political cases to breed procedural defects.9 8 Arrogant
officers who crush opposition are often not scrupulous in obeying the constitu-
tion or sensitive to the standards of procedural due process,9 9 and political
criticism may goad thin-skinned leaders to rash action.1'° Thus, when a union
member mounted a soap box and declared that the union was rotten to the
core, that the leaders were a lot of labor fakers, and that the president was
the worst dog in the heap, he was expelled without notice and hearing. 01
Such defects were particularly prevelent in the past when lawyers were not so
heavily leaned on to avoid pitfalls and to provide the form of fairness.10 2
95. 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
96. In some cases the courts clearly indicated the high value placed on freedom of
speech and assembly within the union, but used other rationale to fit the protection granted
within the contract doctrine. See, e.g., Schrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452
(Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
97. 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931).
98. Factional fights within unions often breed bitterness which leads the dominant
group to look upon the opposition as traitors undeserving of due process. Union officers
may find it difficult, even if they desired to restrain the agitated members sufficiently to
maintain even the form of fairness. For examples of such lynch spirit, see Alexion v. Hol-
lingsworth, 289 N.Y. 91, 43 N.E.2d 825 (1942) ; Ash v. Holdeman, 13 Misc. 2d 528, 175
N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 5 App. Div. 2d 1017, 174 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1958).
99. See, e.g., Rodier v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N.Y. Supp. 336 (1931) ; Dus-
ing v. Nuzzo, 26 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Barry v. Franscona, 28 L.KR.M. 2480
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
100. Gallagher v. Monaghan, 58 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (one who distributed
circulars ordered to trial at international office 600 miles away and president ordered ex-
pulsion without hearing evidence) ; O'Brien v. Papas, 49 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
(defeated candidate and leading supporters expelled without trial).
101. Corregan v. Hay, 94 App. Div. 71, 87 N.Y. Supp. 956 (1904).
102. In many cases the union's lawyer is either physically present during the union
trial or is closely consulted in advance of every step. In some instances the lawyer acts as
prosecuting attorney. If the union constitution permits only union members to act as
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Political discipline is particularly vulnerable to the fatal flaw of bias, for
unions lack any independent judiciary, and trial bodies are politically oriented.
If the trial is before the executive board, the court can find that it includes
those criticized ;103 if it is before an elected committee, the court may find it
controlled by one of the factions ;104 if it is before the local meeting, the court
may find the vote motivated by partisan politics ;105 and even if it is chosen
by lot, the court may find traces of bias.10°
Even though the union avoids substantial procedural defects, the courts
have demonstrated marked ability to find technical violations of the con-
stitution 107 or hidden weaknesses in the evidence.108 Even the union's best
efforts will fail. In Shapiro v. Gehinan 109 a union member who accused
officers of mishandling union funds was charged with slandering officers. The
constitution required a trial before the executive committee, but because this
would have included the officers whom he had accused, a special trial com-
mittee was named. The court declared that that violated the constitution and
ordered him reinstated. In a later case the same court held that where a mem-
ber was tried by an executive committee which included officers whom he had
accused of misconduct, the proceedings were void for bias. 110
counsel, a lawyer may be admitted to membership so as to make him available for this
purpose.
103. Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed, 269 App.
Div. 972, 58 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1945) ; Cohen v. Rosenberg, 262 App. Div. 274, 27 N.Y.S.2d
834 (1941), aff'd, 287 N.Y. 800, 40 N.E.2d 1018 (1942).
104. In Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1957), the meeting
at which the trial committee was elected was so confused that the court could not deter-
mine who was nominated or in what order. Of the seven who were elected, three were paid
employees of the union who owed their jobs to the officers who had been bitterly criticized
by the accused, and a fourth was one who signed and prosecuted charges against other
members of the opposition for the same activity. This created "grave doubts" as to the
impartiality of the committee and was enough to invalidate the discipline.
105. Reilly v. Hogan, 32 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 264 App. Div. 855, 36 N.Y.S.
2d 423 (1942). In Madden v. Atkins, supra note 104, the report of the trial committee was
submitted to the local which voted 51 to 42 for conviction.
106. In Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 528, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226, 232 (1959),
the court wryly observed that the accuser was the one who drew the five names from a hat
and "probably by coincidence on each of three occasions he drew his own name .... "
107. Scivoletti v. Leckie, 148 N.Y.S.2d 50 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd as modified, 4 App.
Div. 2d 773, 165 N.Y.S.2d. 529 (1957) ; Gleeson v. Conrad, 276 App. Div. 861, 93 N.Y.S.2d
667 (1949) ; Schrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Jose v.
Savage, 123 Misc. 283, 205 N.Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
108. Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959) ; Koukly v.
Canavan, 154 Misc. 343, 277 N.Y. Supp. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Koukly v. Weber, 154 Misc.
659, 277 N.Y. Supp. 39 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
109. 244 App. Div. 238, 278 N.Y. Supp. 785, modified, 269 N.Y. 517, 199 N.E. 515
(1935).
110. Cohen v. Rosenberg, 262 App. Div. 274, 27 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1941), aff'd, 287 N.Y.
800, 40 N.E.2d 1018 (1942).
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With the decision in Madden v. Atkins " it is no longer necessary for
courts to use such devices, for the Court of Appeals has forcefully declared
as public policy that "traditionally democratic means of improving their union
may be freely availed of by members without fear of harm or penalty.""12 This
does not mean that the courts will cease using procedural or other discoverable
defects to cloak protection of democratic rights, for they may prefer to use
these more mechanical rationalizations. However, explicit statement of this
limit on union discipline will make judges more consciously aware of their
responsibility for safeguarding these basic rights, and give them a firmer hand
in providing protection.
The articulate recognition of these rights requires the courts to face squarely
what conduct falls within the broad term "traditionally democratic means of
improving their union." The opinion in Madden v. Atkins went no further
then to say that "this necessarily includes the right to criticize current union
leadership and, within the union, to oppose such leadership and its policies." 113
This, however, will not solve the hard problems raised by the wide range of
conduct in political activity cases. An examination of the facts before the
Madden court suggests some of those problems, and gives more specific content
to the court's decision.
The conduct for which Madden and his supporters were expelled was neither
mild nor well-mannered. They brought suit to block an election and threatened
President Atkins that if he resisted the suit they would publish leaflets attack-
ing him. When the suit and threats failed, members of the election committee
who supported Madden refused to proceed with the election and had to be
replaced. Discipline for this "violating his obligation as a member" was not
discussed by the court; but this conduct was in fact protected as a part of the
whole political conflict. The "smear sheets" distributed during the campaign
accused Atkins of having been a Communist, obtaining his license by fraud,
stealing union funds, selling jobs, and rigging elections. This was characterized
by the Appellate Division as "fair comment" to which "union officials, by
offering themselves as candidates . . . subject themselves."
Although its text was strong and even defamatory, that is not abnormal
in such struggles for power in a membership organization, especially a
trade union. If an opposition slate of candidates is not to be granted a
reasonably free hand there would be little chance to bring corruption to
light.""n 4
After they lost the election, Madden and his friends, with the active support
of the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, formed within the union a
permanent organization which collected dues, retained a lawyer, held meetings,
111. 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E2d 73 (1958).
112. Madden v. Atkins, supra note 111, at 293-94, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 640-41, 151 N.E.2d
at 78.
113. Ibid.
114. Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 17, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576, 591 (1957), aff'd as
modified, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
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and issued a periodical criticizing the officers and their handling of union
affairs. The charges of holding "unauthorized meetings" and allowing strang-
ers to attend and discuss union matters were swept aside, and the organizing
of such an opposition group considered a "traditionally democratic means of
improving the union." 115
The words of the court, when viewed against the facts before it, suggest at
least two significant guides. First, the protection of democratic rights is very
broad, including a wide latitude for fair comment, 116 full freedom for organ-
ized opposition,117 and for an extending of the debate beyond the confines of
the union meeting and membership. These rights prevail even though their
exercise may cause disunity and temporary disruption. Second, the court will
not uphold discipline because a union member in the heat of union meetings
or a political contest overstepped the bounds in some relatively minor re-
spect.118 Courts will look to the total context to determine whether the impact
of the discipline is to repress legitimate political debate. These are not new
with Madden v. Atkins; this case only makes more explicit the guides which
the New York courts have in fact followed.
6. Communist Activities
From 1947 to 1953 District Council No. 9 of the Brotherhood of Painters
was racked by a bitter factional fight which shifted constantly from the meet-
ing hall to the courtroom. It reached its climax with the expulsion of three
opposition leaders for Communist Party membership. The constitution was
clear and the facts were admitted; the court's response in Weinstock v. La-
disky "19 was emphatic. The argument that discipline solely for party mem-
bership was contrary to public policy was turned bottoms up. The expulsion
did not infringe on political rights, for they were not members of a political
party, but of a conspiracy to "hatch plots for treason."1 20 The "evils and
dangers of Communism to trade unionism"'12 were "notorious,"' 2 2 and there
was "imminent necessity for action to be taken to protect trade unionism and
the country against those dangers.'12 3 Expulsion for Communist Party mem-
bership was not only permissible, it was a moral duty. Procedural defenses
115. 4 App. Div. 2d at 17, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
116. Compare Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931); Jose v. Savage,
123 Misc. 283, 205 N.Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1924) ; Corregan v. Hay, 94 App. Div. 71, 87
N.Y. Supp. 956 (1904). But see Ames v. Dubinsky, 5 Misc. 2d 380, 70 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup.
Ct. 1947).
117. Compare Scivoletti v. Leckie, 4 App. Div. 2d 773, 165 N.Y.S2d 529 (1957).
118. Compare Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959);
Reilly v. Hogan, 32 N.Y.S2d 864 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 264 App. Div. 855, 36 N.Y.S2d 423
(1942).
119. 197 Misc. 859, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
120. Weinstock v. Ladisky, supra note 119, at 873, 98 N.Y.S2d at 99.
121. Id. at 876, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 102.




were swept aside; claims that the trial was before the wrong union tribunal
were resolved by accepting the union's interpretation of the constitution; and
allegations of double jeopardy were ignored.
Other leaders of the left-wing faction fared no better. French, the business
agent of one local, was charged with improperly permitting the use of spray
guns and barred from all union activities for three years. His suit for rein-
statement, based on claims that his trial violated the union constitution in a
number of respects and also denied due process, was dismissed for his failure
to exhaust union remedies.124 He then completed his internal appeals, and
renewed his suit, only to have it dismissed on the grounds that the first de-
cision was res adjudicata 1125 Davis, secretary of another local, was charged
with slander because of statements he had made in opposing a referendum
for a dues increase, tried by a board which included those allegedly slandered,
found guilty, and barred from union activities for five years. His request for
a temporary injunction was denied because he failed "to establish a clear right
to relief.'1 28 By the time the case was called for trial a year later, 27 it was
moot because he had been expelled as a Communist Party member.' 28 Fritsch,
another opposition leader, brought suit to invalidate a referendum, but relief
was denied because of laches.129 The union then assessed the costs of the suit,
over $200, against Fritsch, and when he moved to have the court order
amended to prevent this, the motion was denied.' 30 Later, when another
member of the opposition challenged a referendum and lost,' 3 ' he too was
assessed costs by the union. A temporary injunction was denied.' 32 By the
time the case was called for trial a year and a half later the plaintiff had come
to terms with the union.' 33
In none of these cases, except Weinstock v. Ladisky, was the communist
issue reflected in the opinions, but it was constantly raised by counsel and was
a strong undercurrent in all of the affidavits and arguments.
The judicial response to such pleas is suggested by less reticent opinions.
In Ames v. Dubinsky 134 seven left-wing candidates for local office distributed
leaflets accusing the incumbent officers and their "administration" or "clique"
of red-baiting, persecuting the leaders of the rank and file, rigging the election,
124. French v. Ladisky, 194 Misc. 549, 78 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 274
App. Div. 765, 80 N.Y.S2d 728 (1948).
125. French v. Ladisky, 274 App. Div. 765, 80 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1949). For a contradic-
tory result when communists were not involved, see Murphy v. Freeman, N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Erie County, July 3, 1956, af'd, 4 App. Div. 2d 743, 164 N.Y,S.2d 981 (1957).
126. Davis v. Ladisky, File No. 13926/46, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, June 23, 1949.
127. Davis v. Ladisky, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, May 29, 1950.
128. See Weinstock v. Ladisky, 197 Misc. 859, 98 N.Y.S2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
129. Fritsch v. Rarback, 199 Misc. 356, 98 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
130. Fritsch v. Rarback, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Jan. 30, 1951.
131. Roman v. Caputo, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, July 3, 1951.
132. Roman v. Caputo, 28 L.R.R.M. 2616 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
133. Roman v. Caputo, Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Feb. 17, 1953.
134. 5 Misc. 2d 380, 70 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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and running a profit-making testimonial dinner. Although vitriolic and potenti-
ally defamatory, the leaflets, with their communist jargon and abusive epithets,
were pallid political commentary compared to the leaflets distributed by Mad-
den and his friends. Ames and others were accused of slandering union
officers, tried before the executive board, and found guilty. This was ratified
by the local, and they were barred from all union activities for five years. The
court, after a fervent though not judicially restrained parading of the evils of
communism, insisted that the issue of communism was of "minor importance,"
except that the leaflets were "quite an exhibition of communist double talk."
The executive board was found to be unbiased because it did not include the
officers who brought the charges, and there was no evidence of probative value
to show domination. The "factual question" of the truth or falsity of the
leaflets and whether they came within the protection of fair comment "must be
regarded as being within the exclusive province of the tribunal . free from
review by . .. any public court.' ' 135
Not even clear proof of Communist Party membership is required to create
a judicial unwillingness to intervene. In Dakchoylous v. Ernst 136 a local
business agent who had opposed the international officers in the last convention
was removed from office and suspended from membership on charges of "asso-
ciating with communists." He claimed that the charges were politically moti-
vated and that his signature on a Communist Party card was either a forgery
or obtained by trickery. The court said that since there was "some evidence"
to support the union's finding, the court could not substitute its judgment of
sufficiency; and even though he signed unwittingly, this did not mitigate the
injury to the local and its members.
7. Summary
Courts' responses to union discipline vary markedly, depending on the
conduct for which punishment is imposed. Strict enforcement of financial
obligations and close regulation of conduct directly related to ie union's col-
lective bargaining function are unhesitatingly upheld, and duel unionism gains
little judicial sympathy. These matters courts view as clearly within the
bounds of union discipline, and policy, as well as doctrinal logic, presses courts
to leave to the unions the power to regulate their own affairs. Courts, how-
ever, penetrate the veil of nominal charges and search out the sources of the
underlying dispute. If they discover that discipline is disguised political re-
pression, or is being used for some other questionable purpose, their tolerance
disappears.
Restrictions on the member's access to the courts, whether directly by disci-
pline, or indirectly by assessing the costs of suit, are of a drastically different
135. Compare the judicial reaction in Reilly v. Hogan, 32 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 264 App. Div. 855, 36 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1942), when a member was expelled for accus-
ing the officers of diverting union funds to aid communist sponsored projects.




order. The courts do not look kindly on such private efforts to bar their
doors.'3 7 Although the courts may turn away a member who has come pre-
maturely or with a worthless case, they do not leave him unprotected from
being lashed by the union for his mistake.
The conduct which has in fact received the broadest judicial protection is the
exercise of democratic rights within the union. The courts have envisioned
unions as democratic institutions, and though seldom articulate, have bent the
theories, case by case, to place freedom of speech and assembly beyond the
reach of union discipline. This basic pattern, long obscured by conradicting
language which may have deceived even the judges who used it, is now made
explicit by Madden v. Atkins.1 3 8
In direct contrast, engaging in communist activities is not only unprotected,
but the very taint may lead to outlawry. This judicial policy seems to prevail
over all others. As the Painters' cases 130 and Ames v. Dubinsky 140 suggest,
the right to criticize union officers suddenly shrivels when exercised by com-
munists; and opposition groups tainted with communism may find themselves
impaled on sharp points of the contract theory or the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine. It is significant that even due process is less due when claimed by
communists. Of the ten cases in which the courts failed to protect members
disciplined for political activity, five involved alleged communists.
It is evident that in confronting discipline cases courts are caught in cross-
currents of varying force which make any simple analysis impossible. In
Cromwell v. Morrin 141 officers of the local were disciplined for calling an
authorized strike. They claimed that the international officers were being paid
off to make a soft contract; and the international in turn claimed that the local
was controlled by communists. The court's response to the union's limitation
on striking and the charge of communism could understandably outweight
its response to the charge of corruption.
Even the weight to be given to a particular value can vary according to
the court's feeling for its importance in the case. For example, the business
agent of a local union in Buffalo was removed from office and barred from
union meetings for five years because he had made expenditures without formal
authorization. He claimed that he was tried without notice of any charges,
and also hinted that the discipline was for political reasons. The court dis-
missed his suit for failure to exhaust his internal remedies.142 He then pursued
his internal appeals, including an appeal to the Ethical Practices Committee,
137. It should be noted that the cases in which the court seemed reluctant to give full
protection to the right to sue or otherwise resort to legal process were ones in which the
disciplined individual was part of a left-wing faction or was accused of corription and
racketeering. See notes 92-94 supra.
138. 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
139. See text at notes 119-36 supra.
140. 5 Misc. 2d 380, 70 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
141. 91 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
142. Murphy v. Milne, Memorandum of Marsh, J., N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, May
9, 1955.
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graphically describing his grievances at length. It merely referred his com-
plaint to the international union, and shortly thereafter he was charged with
"revealing union business to unauthorized persons, namely, submitting the
complaint to the Ethical Practices Committee." When he was ordered to stand
trial before the international officers in Washington, the same court which
had earlier dismissed his suit now enjoined the union from even holding the
trial.1 43 The case was no longer predominantly a financial case, but was now
predominantly one involving political rights; judicial neutrality was replaced
by unhesitating judicial protection.
D. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
In over two-thirds of the cases in which courts grant relief against discipline
they find some flaw in the union's trial procedure. The New York courts are
willing, if not anxious, to use procedural regularity as the ostensible area of
review, for this is an area in which union constitutions provide more specific
guides and in which the courts feel more familiar. Moreover, procedural de-
fects, real or imagined, provide convenient pegs on which to hang decisions
without openly regulating disciplinary offenses. It is therefore difficult to
define with precision the procedural standards actually imposed, independent
of the offense involved.
The most elementary articulate rule is that the union must comply with
the procedure prescribed by its own constitution.144 Deviations at any stage,
whether as to the form or context of the notice,145 make-up and jurisdiction
of the trial body, 40 or procedures for hearing 147 may be termed a breach of
contract and void the proceedings. Substantial fairness and good faith are no
substitute for full compliance. For example, a union can not replace a trial
before the local union with one before a neutral outsider, even though it would
provide a more competent and impartial trial ;148 nor will oral notice suffice
if the constitution requires written charges, even though no prejudice is
143. Murphy v. Sullivan, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, Feb. 12, 1958.
144. See, e.g., Deverell v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 118 N.Y. 101, 23 N.E. 129
(1889).
145. See, e.g., Simons v. Berry, 240 N.Y. 463, 148 N.E. 636 (1925) ; Tesoriero v. Mil-
ler, 74 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
146. See, e.g., Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959);
Browne v. Hibbets, 290 N.Y. 459, 49 N.E.2d 713 (1943) ; Gersh v. Ross, 238 App. Div.
552, 265 N.Y. Supp. 459 (1933).
147. See, e.g., Reubel v. Lewis, 47 N.Y.S2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Holstrom v. In-
dependent Dock Builders, 164 App. Div. 267, 149 N.Y. Supp. 771 (1914).
148. Bauer v. American Fed'n of Grain Millers, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, May 5,
1958. Similarly, in Shapiro v. Gehlman, 244 App. Div. 238, 278 N.Y. Supp. 785 (1935) the
constitution required trial to be held before the local executive committee. The accused mem-
ber was charged with slandering union officers, and a special committee was appointed,
apparently in order to avoid bias. The court held this to be in violation of the constitution
and voided the discipline.
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shown.' 49 This does not mean that the court's function is purely mechanical,
for it may interpret the procedural provisions, treat deviations as insubstantial,
or find a waiver of the defect. There is no pattern of strictness or liberality
in enforcing the constitution, for the procedural provisions are manipulated
by the courts to achieve substantive results. As has already been suggested,
the deviation tolerated depends largely on the judicial tolerance of the offense
punished.
Compliance with the constitution, however, is not enough; the procedure
must provide the rudimentary elements of fairness. The courts early escaped
the inhibiting bounds of the contract theory to declare explicitly that "in the
absence of precise stipulation for notice . . . and hearing . . . public policy
demands that the law intervene to supply such omission."' 150 Consistently,
and without apology or disguise, the courts have imposed a standard of fair-
ness or "natural justice" until it has now become a fundamental principle of
near-constitutional quality. In the words of a recent opinion, "the main ques-
tion in this lawsuit is due process of law, which, under the Constitution of
the United States, is supreme, notwithstanding the constitutions or rules of
labor unions."''5
This leaves unanswered the critical question: what minimum standards
of fairness are imposed by the courts wholly apart from the procedural pro-
visions of union constitutions. The freighted phrases bespeak a strong
judicial concern, and suggest a standard akin to that imposed by due process
on administrative tribunals. Although formal legal procedure is not required,
and adaptations must be made for union structures, the judges look not to union
practices and traditions but to the courts' own traditional notions of the essential
elements of a fair hearing.
Precise definition of the various elements of fairness is difficult, for the
central concern of the court is whether the procedure as a whole is substanti-
ally fair. The court may sense general unfairness, causing it uncritically to
condemn every step in the procedure, 152 or it may isolate and define particular
defects. In spite of this, a pattern is discernible from which it is possible to
identify the essential elements of fairness.
1. Summary Procedure. Inflicting punishment without any notice or hear-
ing will not be tolerated by the courts, 5 3 regardless of the seriousness of the
149. See Soulounis v. Leondopoulos, 2 L.R.1.M. 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938). In Schmidt
v. Rosenberg, 49 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1944), the court found a fatal defect in the failure
of the one who made the charges to appear as a witness as required by the constitution.
150. Bricklayers Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y. Supp. 855, 861 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
151. Sloan v. Braun, 20 Misc. 2d 204, 206, 191 N.Y.S.2d 213, 215 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
152. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Gehlman, 244 App. Div. 238, 278 N.Y. Supp. 785 (1935);
Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Bartone v. Di Pietro, 18 N.Y.S.2d
178 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
153. Rodier v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N.Y. Supp. 336 (1931). This does
not, of course, apply to suspension for nonpayment of dues, assessments, or fines. See text
at notes 64-65 supra.
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offense, 5 4 the obviousness of guilt,' 55 or the vote of the union members.'51
Nor will explicit provisions in the union constitution for such "drum head
courts martial" make them any more acceptable.157 Such crude measures now
seldom come before the courts, for as soon as they are challenged corrective
measures are taken by the union to provide at least the form of fairness.
A more difficult problem is whether the union can take summary action
to suspend and then provide a subsequent hearing. In discipline cases, in
contrast to other union proceedings such as removal of an officer or imposition
of a trusteeship, courts have been hostile to any such procedure. 5s There is
normally no need for immediate action, as continued membership creates no
pressing danger to the union and declarations of guilt can wait upon due
process.
2. Notice of Charges. The accused is entitled to notice of the time and
place of the hearing and to know the charges against him.im9 The courts have
not specified the form or time of serving notice, required the charges to be
in writing or signed, nor objected to the evidence varying from the charge,
so long as there is no surprise or prejudice. 160 They have looked not to the
form but to the substance to determine whether the accused had an adequate
opportunity to prepare his defense. In some of these respects the standard
imposed by the courts is less exacting than that required by many union
constitutions.
3. Right of Counsel. Most unions permit a member on trial to choose counsel
from the membership, but few permit the use of an outside lawyer. So long
as neither side is represented by lawyers the courts find no unfairness. 10
Unions, however, have increasingly relied on lawyers to guide their internal
proceedings and often to act as prosecutors. Courts have recognized the dis-
154. O'Brien v. Papas, 49 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (work stoppages) ; Gilmore
v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N.Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (advocating secession of local).
155. Reubel v. Lewis, 182 Misc. 30, 43 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (temporary in-
junction denied), 47 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (permanent injunction granted; court
assumes plaintiff is guilty of dual unionism).
156. Alexion v. Hollingsworth, 289 N.Y. 91, 43 N.E.2d 825 (1942) ; Ash v. Holde-
man, 13 Misc. 2d 528, 175 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
157. Blek v. Wilson, 145 Misc. 373, 259 N.Y. Supp. 443 (Sup. Ct. 1932), rev'd on
other grounds, 262 N.Y. 253, 186 N.E. 692 (1933) ; Blek v. Kirkman, 148 Misc. 522, 266
N.Y. Supp. 91 (1933) ; Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N.Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct.
1919).
158. Schrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Gleeson v.
Conrad, 81 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup. Ct. 1948), affirned as modified, 276 App. Div. 861, 93
N.Y.S.2d 667 (1949). But see Margolis v. Burke, 53 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
159. Blek v. Wilson, 145 Misc. 373, 259 N.Y. Supp. 443 (Sup. Ct. 1932), rev'd on
other grounds, 262 N.Y. 253, 186 N.E. 692 (1933) ; Corregan v. Hay, 94 App. Div. 71, 87
N.Y. Supp. 956 (1904).
160. Bachman v. Harrington, 52 Misc. 26, 102 N.Y. Supp. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1906).
161. In re Hunt, 45 L.R.R.M. 2993 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960).
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advantage of the accused and have insisted that he be given equal representa-
tion.1
0 2
4. Right to Present Evidence. Devices which substantially burden or pre-
vent the accused from presenting evidence are not tolerated by the courts.
When a member in New York City was ordered to stand trial in Cincinnati
and refused to appear, the court voided the expulsion ;163 and when a member
in Buffalo was served notice of a hearing to be held in Washington, the court
enjoined the holding of the hearing.14 Holding the hearing at a time when
the accused or his witnesses could not attend would be equally unfair, although
the fact of the burden might not be so self-evident. 65
5. Right to Confront and Cross Examine Witnesses. In Shernoff v.
Schiinel 16 the accused was kept outside while the prosecuting witnesses testi-
fied. He was then called in, told the evidence, and offered a chance to question
them or present other evidence. "The procedure," said the officers, "is based
on a long and sad experience of the past. We are waiters not lawyers.' '067 The
court rejected this argument of practical convenience, saying, "The right to a
fair hearing, so basic a concept in our jurisprudence, cannot be sacrificed on the
altar of pragmatism."' 168 This right included "the rights to be confronted with
one's accusers, to be present when the accusation is being made, and to have
the opportunity of cross-examination with respect to the testimony so given
-not on some hearsay condemnation thereof."'16 9 These same principles have
been used to void discipline based on affidavits where the witnesses have not
162. In Wesson v. Actors Equity, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Jan. 3, 1958, the same
judge who decided In re Hunt, supra note 161, issued an ex¢ parte order enjoining the holding
of a trial if the accused was denied right of legal counsel when the union had a lawyer present.
In Schmidt v. Rosenberg, 49 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aft'd, 269 App. Div. 685, 54
N.Y.S.2d 379 (1945), the union was employing legal counsel and the accused sought a post-
ponement until he could obtain counsel. He was forced to go on with the trial, but was
assured that the trial board would protect his interests. The court held that under these
circumstances there could be no finding of waiver of any procedural defect, and found
such a defect in the failure of the one who signed the charges to appear as a prosecuting
witness, even though there was substantial evidence offered by other prosecuting witnesses.
163. Gallagher v. Monaghan, 58 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
164. Murphy v. Sullivan, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, Feb. 12, 1958.
165. Unions at times reject requests for postponements and proceed with the trial in
the absence of the accused. The extent to which the courts will review the reasonableness
of the union's denial is unclear. Compare Shernoff v. Schimel, 28 L.R.R.M. 2495 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1951); Reubel v. Lewis, 47 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 268 App. Div. 764,
50 N.YS.2d 164, appeal dismissed, 293 N.Y. 762, 57 N.E.2d 840 (1944) ; Austin v. Dutcher,
56 App. Div. 393, 67 N.Y. Supp. 819 (1900).
166. 28 L.R.R.M. 2377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
167. Ibid.
168. Id. at 2378.
169. Ibid.; accord, Sloan v. Braun, 191 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Brooks v.
Engar, 259 App. Div. 333, 19 N.Y.S.2d 114, appeal dismissed, 284 N.Y. 767, 31 N.E.2d
514 (1940).
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been subject to cross-examination.170 The court's image of a fair hearing at
this point is that of a traditional judicial proceeding. 171
6. Right to an Unbiased Tribunal. Whether the union trial body is the
local executive board, a specially elected committee, or the local union itself,
it is inevitably influenced by the political pressures within the union. Because
the great majority of litigated discipline cases are rooted in internal factional
struggles, courts are constantly confronted with the potentiality of bias. The
more obvious forms are curtly condemned.'7 2 Thus, a member can not be
tried before an executive board which is appointed by the president who is
bringing the charges,' 7 3 nor can a member who claimed that an election was
fraudulent be tried by the officers who were elected. 174 Much less obvious
distortions created by internal political pressures have been recognized by the
courts. 1 75 In Reilly v. Hogan 176 a leader of the opposition slate charged that
union funds had been used to support the Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish
Civil War. He was tried by the local union and expelled. The court, in order-
ing reinstatement, said, "the case as a whole gives me the definite impression
that the plaintiff was not accorded a fair and impartial trial, and that his ex-
pulsion was animated by partisan politics."'177 Similarly, in Madden v. Atkins,
the trial board included members who held positions in the union. The Appel-
late Division recognized that they could not fairly judge members accused of
criticizing the officers to whom they owed their appointment. 178
Submerged political pressures which lead to prejudice can not always be
traced, and subtle devices may escape detection. Courts, however, are not
blind to the realities of internal union politics, and where bias is sensed but
not susceptible of proof, other more visible defects may be used as grounds
to invalidate the proceedings. Thus, in Fittipaldi v. Legassie 17 the court
observed that in choosing the trial committee by lot, the one drawing names
from the hat was one of the accusers and on three occasions drew his own
170. Harmon v. Matthews, 27 N.Y.S2d 656 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Koukly v. Weber, 154
Misc. 659, 277 N.Y. Supp. 39 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
171. It does not include, however, the right to have witnesses sworn. Dakchoylous v.
Ernst, 282 App. Div. 1101, 126 N.Y.S2d 534 (1953).
172. Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct.), appealed dismissed, 269 App.
Div. 972, 58 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1945) ; Maltz v. Rosenberg, 265 App. Div. 972, 38 N.Y.S.2d
940 (1942).
173. Barry v. Franscona, 28 L.R.R.M. 2480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
174. Cohen v. Rosenberg, 262 App. Div. 274, 27 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1941), aff'd, 287 N.Y.
800, 40 N.E.2d 1018 (1942).
175. In Koukly v. Canavan, 154 Misc. 343, 277 N.Y. Supp. 29 (Sup. Ct. 1935), the
one bringing the charges was a brother of the chairman of the local governing board which
tried the accused. The court recognized the danger of bias because of the chairman's posi-
tion of dominance.
176. 32 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 264 App. Div. 855, 36 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1942).
177. 32 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
178. 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1957), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d
633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
179. 7 App. Div, 2d 521, 184 N,Y.S.2d 226 (1959),
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name. "While [he] did not actually serve," this "[shed] light on the imparti-
ality" of the trial committee and the "atmosphere" in which the trials were
conducted.'8 0 The court then found a violation of the procedural provisions
of the constitution.
The court's sense of responsibility to protect against bias is forcefully
articulated in Madden v. Atkins. The right to "a trial by impartial judges
must be enforced by the court with particular zeal in a case such as this where
the court's power to review is so circumscribed." The tribunal must not be
"subject to the slightest suspicion as to its fairness."' 181 This requirement is
absolute and can not be qualified by claims of practical convenience. "The fact
that there were no members of the board who could qualify as disinterested
judges is irrelevant. If there was a problem as to how to provide an impartial
appellate tribunal for these cases the burden of its solution was the local's."' 8 2
7. Waiver of Defects. There is an evident fear on the part of accused
members, often shared by their lawyers, that if they participate in the hearing
they waive all procedural defects.183 This fear is apparently fed by rulings of
union appeal tribunals that by proceeding a member waives all objections; the
fear is not justified by the conduct of the courts.184 If the accused objects to
the defect and proceeds under protest, his objection is not waived. 8 5 In one
case where a member was forced to proceed without his counsel the court
held that it was the duty of the trial board to protect his rights, and there was
no waiver of even harmless defects to which he had not objected. 8 6 Failure
to object may waive defects, particularly as to the form of the notice, if
there is no substantial unfairness ;187 but the courts have not allowed the
waiver doctrine to be used to trap accused members who proceed in ignorance
of their basic rights. Within these limits, waiver, like all other procedural
180. Id. at 528, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
181. 4 App. Div. 2d. 1, 18, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576, 592-93 (1957), quoting from Matter of
Friedman, 215 App. Div. 130, 136, 213 N.Y. Supp. 369, 376 (1926).
182. Id. at 19, 162 N.Y.S2d at 593.
183. For example, in Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226
(1959), two of the accused members appeared at the trial and objected to the constitution
of the trial body. When this objection was overruled, they refused to proceed, and the trial
was held in their absence.
184. See People ex rel. Deverell v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 118 N.Y. 101, 23
N.E. 129 (1899).
185. Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959); Shapiro v.
Gehlman, 244 App. Div. 238, 278 N.Y. Supp. 785, modified, 269 N.Y. 517, 199 N.E. 515
(1935). If he refuses to proceed, his special appearance does not, of course, waive the
defects. Soulounias v. Leondopoulos, 2 L.R.R.M. 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938).
186. Schmidt v. Rosenberg, 49 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 685,
54 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1945).
187. Strobel v. Irving, 171 Misc. 965, 14 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Belldn v.
Spiegel, 3 L.R.R.M. 800 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938); Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N.Y.
Supp. 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1907), aff'd, 124 App. Div. 915, 108 N.Y. Supp. 1133 (1908) ; Drum-
mond v. Curran, 27 L.R.R.M. 2488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
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elements, is used as a manipulative device to explain results based on more
substantial factors.
8. Double Jeopardy. The rule against double jeopardy has been broadly
stated in Lafferty v. Frenid, "it is generally unjust to require a duly acquitted
man to defend himself a second time, and generally contrary to sound public
policy to permit the reopening of matters once judicially determined... unless
there be some special circumstances making a second trial both necessary and
just.' 1 8 8 The rule as stated is not the rigid one applicable to criminal pro-
ceedings, but is made flexible by the loosely worded exception. This flexibility
is suggested in Weinstock v. Ladisky,'8 9 in which a member was expelled for
being a communist. He admitted the fact, but among other defenses claimed
double jeopardy in that he had been tried on the same charge several years
before and had been acquitted. The court, which did not even dignify this
argument with an answer, was fully aware that at the time of his prior acquittal
the trial board was controlled by the communist faction. This, along with the
continuing nature of the offense, might well have made the court feel that "a
second trial was both necessary and just."
In practical terms, the more important question is whether acquittal by the
trial body can be appealed within the union, for many union constitutions allow
such appeals and even empower the appeal body to find the accused guilty. 0
To order a new trial because of procedural errors or mistakes of law might
not shock the sense of justice, but for an appeal body to reverse an acquittal
and find guilt would not only cut to the very heart of double jeopardy; it
would also raise serious problems of fair hearings. The latter problem is
particularly acute because the appellate tribunal frequently has nothing but an
incomplete and unreliable record of the hearing before the trial board.'
9. Summary. It can be fairly said that in most respects courts closely scruti-
nize union disciplinary proceedings to protect against procedural unfairness.
Although the strictness of the standard may vary some, depending on the
nature of the offense and the obviousness of guilt, the variance is probably
not greater than that practiced in criminal cases in the same courts. The weak-
est point in discipline proceedings, the inherent bias of union tribunals in cases
arising out of factional disputes, is the weakest point in judicial protection.
This is not because of the court's indifference or naivete, but rather because
the political pressures may be so submerged or indirect as to defy proof in
court. In spite of this, most judges sense the dangers and often make some
rough compensation for that which they feel but can not find.
188. 36 L.R.R.M. 2674, 2676 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
189. 197 Misc. 859, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
190. In Peabody v. Kaufman, 61 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd as modified, 270 App.
Div. 1019, 62 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1946), 296 N.Y. 796, 71 N.E.2d 770 (1947), the court refused
to imply a power to reverse an acquittal on appeal and further declared that even to order
a new trial on procedural grounds violated fundamental rights against double jeopardy.
Contra, Rubens v. Weber, 237 App. Div. 15, 260 N.Y. Supp. 701 (1932).
191. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
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E. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
The doctrinal declaration that courts will not intervene in internal union
disputes until all appeals within the union have been exhausted has, in theory,
three underlying policies. First, union appellate tribunals may take corrective
action, thus reducing the burden on the courts. Second, the benefit of the
expert judgment of these tribunals might aid courts in making more respon-
sible decisions. Third, the deep and pervading principle of preserving the
autonomy of unions constrains courts to give the union full responsibility and
opportunity to correct its own mistakes. Against these policies is balanced
the policy of providing reasonably prompt and effective judicial protection
to important legal rights.
The discipline cases present a complex pattern of adherence and rejection
of these policies. From the general rule the courts have carved various ex-
ceptions, some which reflect the underlying policies and some which seem to
ignore them and effectively repudiate the rule.
1. Exceptions to the Rule
Futility of Appeal. If the internal appeal will obviously be fruitless, the
court's withholding its hand serves no policy other than temporary recognition
of union autonomy, and this at the expense of postponed protection to the
injured individual. The balance struck by the courts in favor of the disciplined
member is clear. More important, total futility need not be proved. It is
enough to show that the appeal is to an international executive board presided
over by an officer who was slandered by the accused, 192 or that some members
of the board have prejudged the case ;193 and when one intermediate appeal is
excused, all subsequent appeals are likewise excused regardless of their ade-
quacy.19 4
The test of the courts seems to be less one of futility than of fairness; it is
not the lack of likelihood of reversal, but the lack of an impartial tribunal which
excuses exhaustion. 195 Similarly, if the trial record is incomplete or inaccu-
192. Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1957) ; Corregan v. Hay,
94 App. Div. 71, 87 N.Y. Supp. 956 (1904) ; see Barry v. Franscona, 28 L.R.R.M. 2480
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
193. O'Brien v. Pappas, 49 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; Reilly v. Hogan, 32 N.Y.S.
2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; Rodier v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N.Y. Supp. 336 (1931);
Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N.Y. Supp. 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
194. In all of these cases further appeals were available beyond the step the court
termed futile, either to the international president, the international executive board, or to
the convention. The courts have not required the plaintiff to show that these further steps
were futile or should be excused on some other ground.
195. In Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 18-19, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576, 593 (1957), the
court, in excusing appeals because of obvious bias, said, "They were entitled to have not
only their trials, but also their appeals, held and determined by impartial judges.... What
was said in Wilcox, supra, as to the selection of judges for trials such as these may equally
be applied to judges on the appeals."
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rate,1 6 or the one appealing is denied access to records necessary to prepare
his appeal, 197 there is a fatal lack of fairness. Even hearing the appeal at such
a distance as to burden the member in personally presenting it excuses him
from resorting to the appeal. 198
Delay of Appeals. The policy of prompt protection of rights may outweigh
the other policies if the time required for internal appeals is too long, but the
courts do no explicit balancing. In expulsion cases delays of one year or more
have been held to be too long,199 but in suspension cases an appeal available
only after the suspension has expired, and the member has been reinstated,
may be considered too late.2 0 0 In Browne v. Hibbets 20 1 the failure of an
appeal tribunal to give an answer for one month was held to justify judicial
intervention.202
In most of the cases in which the court relied on the element of delay, the
disciplined member was apparently barred from his job. In one he was
suspended from his position as paid business agent,20 3 and in another the delay
in internal appeals would have caused him to forfeit the insurance which he
had acquired as a part of his membership.2°4 It is doubtful, however, whether
courts give special weight to these economic factors as compared with the
injury sustained by a disciplined member who is deprived of his right to par-
ticipate in the union or to run for union office during a protracted appeal.20 5
196. See Tesoriero v. Miller, 274 App. Div. 670, 88 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1949); Reilly v.
Hogan, 32 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct), aff'd, 36 N.Y.S.2d 423 (App. Div. 1942).
197. Brooks v. Engar, 259 App. Div. 333, 19 N.Y.S.2d 114, appeal dismissed, 284 N.Y.
767, 31 N.E.2d 514 (1940) ; Corregan v. Hay, 94 App. Div. 71, 87 N.Y. Supp. 956 (1904).
198. Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1957) ; Corregan v. Hay,
supra note 179; Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N.Y. Supp. 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1907), aff'd,
124 App. Div. 915, 108 N.Y. Supp. 1133 (1908).
199. Reilly v. Hogan, 32 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct), aff'd, 264 App. Div. 855, 36 N.Y.S.
2d 423 (1942) (1 year); Bricklayers Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y. Supp. 855 (Sup. Ct.
1920), aff'd, 198 App. Div. 967, 189 N.Y. Supp. 938 (1921) (15 months); Gleeson v. Con-
rad, 81 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 276 App. Div. 861, 93 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1949)
(5 years) ; Fritz v. Knaub, supra note 180 (19 months).
200. MacPherson v. Green, 72 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Murphy v. Freeman,
Memorandum of Rowe, J., N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, July 3, 1956, aff'd, 4 App. Div.
743, 164 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1957); Shernoff v. Schimel, 28 L.R.R.M. 2377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1951).
201. 290 N.Y. 459, 49 N.E.2d 713 (1943).
202. Similarly, in Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73
(1958) the court held that the failure of the local executive board to act on appeals for
six months and the failure of the national executive board to act for four months justified
the member in seeking legal relief. See also Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184
N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959) (where no reply for two years).
203. Murphy v. Freeman, supra note 200.
204. Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N.Y. Supp. 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
205. In discipline cases generally, and particularly those in which the courts excuse
exhaustion, the elements of economic injury are commonly mentioned. See, e.g., Suma v.
Landrisina, 36 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1942). However, the whole body of cases does not
indicate that this is a critical factor in the outcome of the cases, or that it is given special
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Void Proceedings. An all-consuming exception to the exhaustion doctrine
has been succinctly stated in the leading case of Tesoriero v. Miller :206
It is well settled that if the action of the union is without jurisdiction,
or is without notice or authority or not in compliance with the rules or
constitutional provisions, or is void for any reason, the obligation to
appeal within the union is not imposed, but the complaining member may
resort directly to the courts.207
This exception has in fact been as broadly applied as is here stated. Pro-
ceedings have been found void because they have denied due process for lack
of notice or hearing,208 for bias of the tribunal,20 9 or for holding the hearing
at a distance.210 Any failure to comply with the constitution may likewise
cause courts to find voidness. Thus, exhaustion has been excused because the
offense charged was not prohibited by the constitution, 211 the notice was de-
fective as to form,212 the trial body was improperly constituted,21 3 or suspen-
sion for failure to appear at a hearing was not authorized by the constitution 21 4
This exception has been used even to enjoin the union from holding a trial
in the first instance when the defect is clear.21 5 Thus courts have enjoined
unions from proceeding with hearings where they were to be held in a distant
city,210 before an improperly named tribunal,217 without an equal right of
counsel,218 or in violation of the right against double jeopardy.21 9
weight when exhaustion is excused because of delay. The cases in which exhaustion is re-
quired also contain many in which the member was barred from his job or suffered other
economic injury.
206. 274 App. Div. 670, 88 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1949).
207. Id. at 672, 88 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
218. Wesson v. Actors Equity, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Jan. 3, 1958.
App. Div. 712, 262 N.Y. Supp. 416, rev'd on other grounds, 262 N.Y. 253, 186 N.E. 692
(1933) ; Rodier v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N.Y. Supp. 336 (1931) ; Baritone v.
Di Pietro, 18 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N.Y.
Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
209. Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed, 269 App.
Div. 972, 58 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1945).
210. Gallagher v. Monaghan, 58 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
211. Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931) (court gave relief without
mentioning that trial court had denied relief for failure to exhaust) ; Tesoriero v. Miller,
274 App. Div. 670, 88 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1949) ; Gleeson v. Conrad, 81 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup. Ct.
1948), aff'd, 276 App. Div. 861, 93 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1949).
212. Soulounias v. Leondopoulos, 2 L.R.R.M. 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938).
213. Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959); Gersh v.
Ross, 238 App. Div. 552, 265 N.Y. Supp. 459 (1933) ; Shapiro v. Brennan, 269 N.Y. 517,
199 N.E. 515 (1935) ; Jose v. Savage, 123 Misc. 283, 205 N.Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
214. Reubel v. Lewis, 47 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
215. Suma v. Landriscina, 36 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Dusing v. Nuzzo, 26
N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
216. Murphy v. Sullivan, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, Feb. 12, 1958.
217. Bauer v. American Federation of Grain Millers, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, May
5, 1958.
218. Wesson v. Actors Equity, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Jan. 3, 1958.
219. Lafferty v. Fremad, 36 L.R.R.M. 2674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
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It is apparent that this exception is capable of completely swallowing the
rule, for it is applicable to every case in which the disciplined member has a
meritorious claim. Contrary to the other exceptions, it has no visible roots
in any of the policies underlying the rule, but under the thin verbal disguise
of "no jurisdiction" and "void" it repudiates the rule and its policies. This
exception, like other exceptions, is not consistently applied, but it is used fre-
quently and is always available for courts to use when they feel the need
to grant relief.
2. Adherence to the Rule
These multiple exceptions have obviously removed the requirement of ex-
haustion as an insuperable obstacle to judicial intervention. Systematic study
of the cases shows that by applying the exceptions courts have sapped the
rule of almost all vitality except in random cases. Out of more than 100
discipline cases, the rule has been applied in 20, but even this may exaggerate
its importance. In seven of those cases, the court's opinion makes clear on
its face that the plaintiff's case had no merit or was procedurally defective,
and that failure to exhaust was added only as a makeweight. 220 In six, suit
was brought even before the union trial body had made a decision, and in none
of these was there any clear error shown in the proceedings. 221 The remaining
seven cases might be considered common-place enforcement applications of
the rule, but they are not all of one piece. For example, in one the court's
responsibility was lightened by the fact that the expelled members were given
full membership in the union, including the right to run for office, pending
the internal appeals ;222 in another case the judge woodenly refused to excuse
a failure to exhaust even though the appeal was to a tribunal which included
the officers he had accused of misuse of funds ;223 and in still another the doc-
trine was so manipulated as to totally frustrate the leader of a left-wing faction
from getting any judicial review of his expulsion, even after he had exhausted
his internal appeals.224
220. Dakchoylous v. Ernst, 282 App. Div. 1101, 126 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1953); Weinstock
v. Ladisky, 197 Misc. 859, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Cromwell v. Morrin, 91
N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Rubin v. Greenberg, 3 L.R.R.M. 801 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1939); Belkin v. Spiegel, 3 L.R.R.M. 800 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938); Havens v. King, 221
App. Div. 475, 224 N.Y. Supp. 193 (1927), aff'd sub nor. Havens v. Dodge, 250 N.Y. 617,
166 N.E. 346 (1929) ; Stroebel v. Irving, 171 Misc. 965, 14 N.Y.S.2d 864 (N.Y. City
Munic. Ct. 1939).
221. Thomas v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 121 N.Y. 45, 24 N.E. 24 (1890);
Zalnerovich v. Van Ausdal, 65 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; Bernstein v. Robinson, 63
N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; Bloom v. Nann, 41 N.Y.S2d 852 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; Dixon
v. Sheridan, 38 L.R.R.M. 2050 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (suspended for nonpayment of
assessment, brought suit before date of hearing on disputed question of validity of assess-
ment); Rutherford v. Busch, 40 L.R.R.M. 2535 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
222. Cunningham v. Milk Drivers Local 584, 148 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
223. Podlas v. Ruehl, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, Aug. 22, 1940.
224. See cases cited and accompanying text notes 124-25 supra. The other cases show
further variations. In Reubel v. Lewis, 182 Misc. 30, 43 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1943)
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This scattered application of the rule is in sharp contrast to the thirty-six
discipline cases in which courts expressly applied one or more exceptions to ex-
cuse exhaustion. Moreover, in more than thirty cases courts made no mention
of exhaustion, and study of the court files indicates that this judicial silence
sometimes conceals the court's deliberate overlooking of failure to exhaust.
Courts' demonstrated willingness to excuse exhaustion while giving lip
service to the rule may seem incongruous, for the rule is based on policies
which should be expected to carry special weight with the courts-policies
which involve the work load of courts, the need for expert guidance, and
the desire to preserve union autonomy. The most plausible explanation is that
courts have little real confidence in union appeal procedures. Appellate tri-
bunals are, like trial tribunals, part of the union's political structure, and
litigated discipline cases are so often facets of a factional fight which have
implications beyond the particular local that the courts distrust the handling
of such appeals. The frequent inadequacy or unreliability of the trial record
makes responsible review on appeal nearly impossible, and the decisions of the
appellate body are totally unilluminating to the court. To all of this is added the
courts' common impression, gained from the cases themselves, that union
appeals are shunted about through unnecessarily numerous steps, finally ter-
minating in some remote convention. All of these factors feed the judges'
suspicions that when the union pleads failure to exhaust internal appeals, it
seeks not an opportunity to correct errors, but an opportunity to exhaust the
disciplined member. Once this suspicion is entertained, consciously or un-
consciously, the policies underlying the rule are nullified and policies pressing
for immediate intervention prevail.
C. Protection Within the Rule
Courts have shown little imagination in creating remedial orders which
might preserve some of the values of the rule and yet not leave the member
unprotected. The striking exception of Shernoff v. Schimel 225 suggests at
least one possibility. The plaintiff, who had been expelled after a trial which
denied him the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, immediately
sought a temporary injunction. The court ordered him reinstated to member-
ship and restored to his regular job while he pursued his appeals in the union.
The appellate tribunal of the union promptly ordered a new trial with full
rights of confrontation and cross-examination. The plaintiff refused to appear
(the court denied a temporary injunction for failure to exhaust, but after trial excused
nonexhaustion, 47 N.Y.S.2d 147), aff'd, 268 App. Div. 764, 50 N.Y.S.2d 164, appeal
dismissed, 293 N.Y. 762, 57 N.E.2d 840 (1944). But in McCauly v. Hoey, N.Y.L.J., July
26, 1957, p. 5, col. 8 (Sup. Ct.), the judge excused nonexhaustion and referred the matter
to a referee for a hearing on the merits, but he dismissed the complaint for failure to
exhaust. Two cases which represent straightforward application of the rule are Murphy
v. Milne, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County 1955, and Bertucci v. United Cement Masons Union
Local 570, 139 Misc. 703, 249 N.Y. Supp. 635 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
225. 28 L.R.M. 2377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
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or participate in the second trial and was again found guilty. In the absence
of any clear showing of unfairness in the second trial, or efforts by the plaintiff
to appeal within the union, the court refused to give further protection. 226
The significant point is that the court escaped the dilemma of either supersed-
ing the union's appellate procedures or leaving the member wholly unprotected
during protracted appeals. It did this by the simple device of protecting his
membership rights pending internal appeals conditioned on his reasonable
pursuit of those appeals. The responsibility for taking corrective action was
left on the union, and the incentive was placed on the union not to delay, but
to expedite, appeals. The court, in turn, because it gave only interim relief,
did not need to make the close inquiry required for making the ultimate
decision. The member was, in the meantime, given full protection.227
The device of staying execution of the union's action pending internal
appeals was first used by the Cardozo Court,228 but has been overlooked by
subsequent courts: The single exception was in the Shernoff v. Schinzel case.220
In spite of the lack of confidence which courts have manifested in union ap-
pellate procedures, unions' tribunals should not be denied the opportunity to
prove themselves, particularly when this can be so easily allowed without
any substantial loss of protection to the individual.230
F. EFFECTIVENESS OF JUDIcIAL REMEDIES
judicial protection against oppressive union discipline is meaningful only to
the extent that effective remedies are practically available. Measuring the
effectiveness of remedies in practical terms requires close scrutiny of at least
three factors: first, the forms of remedies available; second, the delay involved
in obtaining judicial protection; and third, the costs of litigation. The ultimate
concern is the impact of the judicial action on the democratic processes of the
unions. Little understanding of the effectiveness of remedies can be gained
from the published opinions, and self-evident assumptions often prove empty
upon closer scrutiny of the litigation. The material here is based largely on a
detailed study of court files and interviews with lawyers who handled these
cases.
226. 28 L.R.R.M. 2495 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
227. Substantially the same device was used by the Teamsters to avoid judicial inter-
vention in Cunningham v. Milk Drivers, Local 584, 148 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
228. Powell v. United Ass'n of Plumbers, 240 N.Y. 616, 148 N.E. 728 (1925) (enjoin
consolidation of locals pending appeal to convention).
229. See 106 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1951). It has also been overlooked by the law-
yers who have not requested or even suggested such a device, but who have sought either
to enforce or escape the exhaustion rule entirely.
230. Such an order would handicap the union in effecting an immediate ouster of those
found unfit, but the delay will be only that produced by the union's own appellate pro-
ceedings. In special cases the court could tailor the interim order to balance the interests
of the union and the disciplined member.
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1. Forms of Remedies
Suits for wrongful discipline are almost always equitable proceedings seek-
ing two remedies-reinstatement in the union and damages.231 Proceedings in
the nature of mandamus 2 have fared badly,23 3 are generally unfamiliar to
lawyers, and offer no advantages. Even though the disciplined member has
no desire for reinstatement, but only for damages, such equitable relief as
reinstatement may be sought as a method of avoiding the delays which are
commonly involved in obtaining a jury trial.24
Reinstatement
If the court finds the discipline wrongful it orders full reinstatement to
membership rights, and this is enforceable with the full panoply of equitable
powers, including contempt.2 3 5 Circumvention by concocting new charges for
some other offense will not hoodwink judges who customarily in these cases
look behind the form to the substance,2 0 and there is no evidence that such
devices are often attempted. On the contrary, even though the discipline is
voided for procedural reasons and the union might retry the member, such
action is seldom taken. In almost every case the order of reinstatement is in
fact final.237
Judicial orders can not restore a member to full union fellowship, and rein-
statement may be blighted by traditional union hostility to courts. In practice,
however, this seems to be less important than might be at first imagined. In
some unions, such as the National Maritime Union, resort to the courts has
become an accepted part of internal union disputes. Moreover, the fact that
the litigated case is commonly championed by one political group within the
231. Equitable relief is not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §
876(a). Internal union disputes have been held not to be a "labor dispute" within the
definition of the act. LaRose v. Possehl, 156 Misc. 476, 282 N.Y. Supp. 332 (1935).
232. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 1283-1306.
233. Solomon v. Brotherhood of Painters, 218 N.Y. 115, 112 N.E. 752 (1916); In re
Sabella, 37 L.R.R.M. 2003 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). But see Petrie v. Ruehl, 22 N.Y.S.2d
549 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
234. For example, the plaintiff in Tesoriero v. Miller, 274 App. Div. 670, 88 N.Y.S.2d
87 (1949) went into business for himself after his discharge, and though he won an order
of reinstatement never sought to return.
235. See Madden v. Atkins, 8 App. Div. 2d 974, 190 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1959), appeab
dismissed, 7 N.Y.2d 922, 197 N.Y.S.2d 724, 165 N.E.2d 750 (1960), holding the union
liable in contempt for damages for failure to comply with the court's order. These were
ultimately assessed at more than $42,000. See Madden v. Atkins, 19 Misc. 2d 138, 191
N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1959). A similar contempt order was issued in Schrebank v.
Kempter, Memorandum, Cavagan, J., N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Feb. 7, 1950.
236. See Browne v. Hibbets, 25 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 290 N.Y. 459,
49 N.E.2d 713 (1943) ; Murphy v. Sullivan, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, Feb. 12, 1958.
237. If the court orders reinstatement pending further internal union proceedings, the
union is much more likely to order a retrial. See Shernoff v. Schimel, 28 L.R.R.M. 2495
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951). This might be one reason that plaintiffs' lawyers have not re-
quested such relief.
1960]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
union as resistance to alleged oppression makes the individual involved a
martyr and often converts a favorable court opinion into an effective political
document. Thus, in Madden v. Atkins 23s the legal triumph of the opposition
was the prelude to its political triumph in the local union.2 39
If expulsion or suspension affects the member's job right, full protection
is much more difficult. In Gleeson v. Conrad 240 the court said it could not
order the union to demand his reemployment, as this was under the control
of the employer. All that the union could be required to do was notify the
employer of his reinstatement and "request" his employment. 2 4 ' The National
Maritime Union, after failing in the expulsion of those who had been convicted
of narcotic offenses prior to becoming members, simply refused to refer them
to jobs from the hiring hall on the grounds that they were unfit.2 42 The federal
remedies under the Taft-Hartley Act could reach a problem like Gleeson v.
Conrad, for the order could run against both the union and the employer. It
could not reach the N.M.U. cases, if denial of referral to narcotics offenders
is solely on the basis of their criminal record and not their union status. -2 43
Damages
Although the New York courts commonly awarded damages against unions
in expulsion cases, 244 a cloud was cast by several decisions which denied the
238. 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
239. Three of the plaintiffs became leaders in the opposition group, The Party for
Union Democracy. In a court supervised election in February, 1960, this group won four
places on the seven man executive committee, President, Vice-President, Secretary-
Business Manager, and one trustee. One of the plaintiffs has been appointed to the critical
post of Chief Dispatcher of the local. The success of the opposition group in New York
seems to have sparked opposition groups in other locals of the union.
In Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959), the insurgent
group, of which the plaintiffs were a part, won an election ousting Legassie and other
incumbents even before the plaintiffs won reinstatement; and in Murphy v. Freeman, 4
App. Div. 743, 164 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1957), a consideration motivating the union officials
in seeking to prevent Murphy from getting reinstated prior to the next election may have
been their fear that he would win.
240. 276 App. Div. 861, 93 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1949).
241. 93 N.Y.S.2d at 669. The court indicated that under the contract the em-
ployer was not obligated to rehire as seniority terminated after two years. The plain-
tiffs suffered additional loss in that their group insurance with the employer was cancelled.
The court was also unable to reinstate this as it was not within the control of the union.
242. Pabon v. Curran, 44 L.R.R.M. 2178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
243. Much more subtle forms of job discrimination may be used, with or without
any formal disciplinary action. The hiring hall is a convenient device, but cooperative
employers may also aid in eliminating employees objectionable to the union leaders. Any
such discrimination which has as its purpose the enforcing of a union membership rule is
a violation of § 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2), but proving the discrimination and its purpose
may be impossible.
244. See, e.g., People ex rel. Deverell v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 118 N.Y.
101, 23 N.E. 129 (1889); Blek v. Wilson, 262 N.Y. 253, 186 N.E. 692 (1933); Polin v.
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liability of the unions. They held that, as unincorporated associations, unions
could be held liable only if actions had been authorized or ratified by all of the
members; the expelled members could only sue those individuals who had
acted in bad faith.2 This cloud was partly dispelled by Madden v. Atkin. 246
After wrestling with the precedents, the Court of Appeals stated the principle
to be deduced in expulsion cases in elliptical terms:
Where it is brought about by action on the part of the membership, at a
meeting or otherwise, in accordance with the union constitution, the act
of expulsion will be regarded as the act of the union for which damages
may be recovered from union funds. Where, however, proof of such union
action is lacking, the claim for damages against the organization must
fail.247
The verbal formula of the court seems to be that where the constitution
delegates the power of expulsion to a trial committee or a regular meeting,
every member, by joining the union, authorizes the action and thereby subjects
the funds of the union to liability for abuse of that power.
The language of delegation rationalizes judicial undermining of the anachro-
nistic rule which gave unincorporated associations almost total immunity from
tort and contract liability. However, it provides no useful test of the limits of
liability for it can be manipulated to deny liability entirely. Thus, if the
offense charged were not provided in the constitution, or if the notice did not
conform to the constitutional requirements, the union might argue that no
authority had been delegated by the members to try that case, and that there-
fore no liability could be found. If the trial body were improperly constituted
(a common defect) a court might hold that there was no delegation whatso-
ever to that body and deny damages.2 48
Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931); Shapiro v. Gehlman, 244 App. Div. 238, 278
N.Y. Supp. 785, modified sub nora. Shapiro v. Brennan, 269 N.Y. 517, 199 N.E. 515
(1935); Brooks v. Engar, 259 App. Div. 333, 19 N.Y.S.2d 114, appeal dismissed, 284
N.Y. 767, 31 N.E.2d 514 (1940); Reubel v. Lewis, 47 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
268 App. Div. 764, 50 N.Y.S.2d 164, appeal dismissed, 284 N.Y. 767, 57 N.E.2d 840
(1944); O'Brien v. Papas, 49 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
245. Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 683 (1951); Glauber v. Patof, 294
N.Y. 583, 63 N.E.2d 181 (1945); Browne v. Hibbets, 290 N.Y. 459, 49 N.E.2d 713
(1943) ; Havens v. King, 221 App. Div. 475, 224 N.Y. Supp. 193 (1927), aff'd sub nora.,
Havens v. Dodge, 250 N.Y. 617, 166 N.E. 346 (1929); Gleeson v, Conrad, 276 App.
Div. 861, 93 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1949). The courts, however, were at times liberal in finding
ratification by silence. O'Brien v. Papas, 49 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
246.' 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
247. Id. at 296, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 642, 151 N.E.2d at 79.
248. In such cases, the courts often declare that the trial body had "no valid existence"
and that the proceedings are "totally void." This language is used to justify excusing ex-
haustion, but having used such language to find that the plaintiff had a cause of action,
the court would make transparent its dissembling metaphor to find "delegation." This
embarrassment was nearly avoided in Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184
N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959) by ordering retrail on the issue of damages. This verbal incon-
sistency will be softened by separation.
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Such wooden logic would defeat the more basic policy which motivated the
Court of Appeals in awarding damages, for the member's need for protection
is the same regardless of the defect which made his expulsion wrongful. As
the court said:
If one wrongfully expelled has no redress for damage suffered, little
more is needed to stifle all criticism within the union. Few are martyrs
enough to suffer the anguish, the risk and the expense of the suit itself;
fewer, if any, to suffer in addition, the loss of wages for the usually lengthy




The union's liability, however, is not unlimited, for courts are reluctant to
make union funds liable for every act of misconduct of the officers. In Madden
v. Atkins one of the plaintiffs was a member of another local. He was not
served with charges or tried, but when he sought to ship out of the local
hiring hall President Atkins tore up his shipping permit. The court, without
any helpful discussion, held that he could not recover against the local union,
but only against Atkins personally. He was not wronged "by any act of the
membership." 250 This leaves indistinct the limits of liability. The test would
seem to be whether those who imposed the discipline had some substantial
color of authority to act either under the constitution or some other formal
action by a governing body of the union.
2 51
The amount of damages is usually based on the loss of earnings due to the
discipline, including loss of fringe items such as health and welfare benefits
and pension rights.252 Calculating these may be complicated, but creates no
serious stumbling block.2 53 However, if the discipline results in a loss of
seniority rights, the problem of measuring damages is not one of mathematics
but of fortune telling, and courts can at best make informed guesses. Presum-
ably, added damages might be awarded for emotional distress caused by the
discipline, but this seems never to be sought.
The amount recovered in these cases can be substantial if several members
have been disciplined and the proceedings are prolonged. In two cases, the
249. Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 296-97, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 643, 151 N.E2d
73, 80 (1958).
250. Id. at 297, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 643, 151 N.E2d at 80.
251. Some light on the extent of the union's liability may be shed by the earlier cases
awarding damages which were relied on by the court as precedents. These included: Blek
v. Wilson, 262 N.Y. 253, 186 N.E. 692 (1933) (no notice of changes and no substantial evi-
dence to support the charge) ; Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931) (Conduct
did not violate offense provision of constitution) ; Shapiro v. Gehlman, 244 App. Div. 238,
278 N.Y. Supp. 785 (1935) (tried before the wrong trial tribunal) ; Brooks v. Engar, 250
App. Div. 333, 19 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1940) (denied fair trial).
252. The expelled member is, of course, under a duty to mitigate damages by seeking
other employment, or, as the court observed, the union itself might mitigate by permitting
him to work pending appeals within the union. Ibid.
253. For some of the complexities in calculating damages, see Madden v. Atkins, 199
N.Y.S.2d 1009( Sup. Ct. 1959), modified, 203 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 1960).
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damages awarded were more than $3,000,254 and one case was settled for
$8,000. Far overshadowing all others is Madden v. Atkins, in which five
members were awarded a total of nearly $250,000 against the local union.2 55
Judgments against the local union, even large ones, are normally collectible,
for local treasuries have usually proven to be adequate.2 50
The damage remedy helps supplement the remedy of reinstatement, but its
practical value is subject to substantial discount. First, since the enactment of
sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) of Taft-Hartley, unions have tended to avoid
infringing on the disciplined member's employment opportunities in any prov-
able fashion.25 7 Second, the awarding of damages tends to make settlement
more difficult and protracts litigation, for the slate can not be wiped clean by
restoring the man to membership. In Madden v. Atkins the litigation over
damages continued for more than two years, with a multitude of motions,
hearings, and appeals after the decision on the merits. Third, and probably
most important, there are serious political obstacles to collecting damages.
Union members tend to accept in good grace judicial orders of reinstatement,
but they rebel against any attempt to appropriate a part of their dues money.
The one who collects damages finds himself politically discredited. 258 Investi-
gation has shown that only in exceptional cases are the damages in fact col-
lected, for the reinstated member does not wish to risk this ostracism. 259
Because of these limitations on the damage remedy, it is apparent that damages
are no substitute for prompt reinstatement in the union.
254. Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931) ; Shapiro v. Gehlman, 244
App. Div. 238, 278 N.Y. Supp. 785 (1935), modified, sub norn., Shapiro v. Brennan, 269
N.Y. 517, 199 N.E. 515 (1935).
255. The damages for the seven months that the union was in contempt for failure
to reinstate after the order by the Appellate Division was $42,887, including $7,000 at-
torney's fees. See Madden v. Atkins, 19 Misc. 2d 138, 191 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
The damages for the four and one-half years of expulsion prior to this were assessed at
$199,477. Madden v. Atkins, 199 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1959), vzodified, 203 N.Y.S.2d
33 (App. Div. 1960). For a period of over seven months, this remained unpaid and was
accruing interest at more than $1,000 a month.
The sixth plaintiff, who was not expelled but whose shipping permit was torn up by
Atkins, recovered a judgment against him individually for $42,817. Id. at 1020.
256. The $250,000 judgment in Madden v. Atkins, for example, was collectible. How-
ever, the judgment against Atkins individually appeared to be largely uncollectible.
257. This restraint does not apply where the employer is outside the discretionary
jurisdictional limits of the NLRB, or if the employment is not subject to the act. For
example,'Madden v. Atkins involved the Master Mates and Pilots, a union of licensed
deck officers who under § 2(11) were "supervisors" and therefore not subject to the act.
258. In the election in Local 88, following Madden v. Atkins, the one candidate who
had a judgment for damages was defeated and it was generally felt that his damage claim
contributed substantially to his defeat.
259. Madden v. Atkins was exceptional, for the local's assets had been impounded for
two years. The local had been under trusteeship in the meantime and had accumulated a
new treasury. Collection out of the impounded assets created relatively little resentment,
but collection out of the active treasury was a political impossibility.
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2. Delay in Legal Relief
The effectiveness of legal remedies depends almost entirely on the prompt-
ness with which reinstatement is achieved. The test is not the time required
to get a final adjudication on appeal, but the time required to obtain an order
of reinstatement. Long delays in litgation impose little hardship if the mem-
bers' rights are protected in the interim. The critical stage, therefore, is not
the appeal but the motion for a temporary injunction.
Courts can and do give temporary injunctions protecting disciplined mem-
bers' rights pending trial of the issues, and such relief can be given with what-
ever speed the situation demands.260 In one recent case a temporary injunction
was issued in time to block a hearing scheduled to be held in a distant city,261
and in two other recent cases ex parte restraining orders were granted to
interrupt hearings already begun.2 62 Although obtaining a temporary injunc-
tion after discipline has been imposed takes somewhat longer, study of court
files reveals that such motions are usually decided in less than two months
from the time the plaintiff brings suit.
Courts do not always issue temporary injunctions to protect the disciplined
members pending trial. Their refusal is excused with obscuring language that
"the facts are in dispute," or that there is "no clear showing of a right to
relief," which is indeed true, just as it is in those cases in which they do grant
temporary injunctions. Close study of the cases leads to the conclusion that
when interim relief is denied, it is not because the particular remedy is inappro-
priate, but because the court is not convinced of the substantive merits of the
plaintiff's case.2 63 The judges weigh the conflicting affidavits, hear the oral
argument, and try to judge the underlying merits. The standard applied is
substantially the same as that used for granting permanent injunctions. This
conclusion is borne out by the fact that almost invariably the result after trial
is the same as that on the motion for temporary injunction. 26
260. For older cases in which temporary injunctions were granted, see Koukly v.
Canavan, 154 Misc. 343, 277 N.Y. Supp. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1935); La Rose v. Possehl, 156
Misc. 476, 282 N.Y. Supp. 332 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Licameli v. Weinstock, 3 L.R.R.M. 799
(N.Y. Sup, Ct. 1938); Dusing v. Nuzzo, 26 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Browne v.
Hibbets, 263 App. Div. 827, 31 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1941), modified, 290 N.Y. 459, 49 N.E.2d
713 (1943),
261. Murphy v. Sullivan, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, Feb. 12, 1958.
262. Wesson v. Actors Equity, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Jan. 3, 1958; Bauer v.
American Fed'n of Grain Millers, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, May 5, 1958.
263. See, e.g., Dakchoylous v. Ernst, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Albany County, Nov. 16, 1951,
later proceeding in same case, 203 Misc. 277, 118 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 282
App. Div. 1101, 126 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1953); Weinstock v. Ladisky, 197 Misc. 859, 98
N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1950); French v. Ladisky, 194 Misc. 549, 78 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup.
Ct. 1947); Roman v. Caputo, 28 L.R.R.M. 2616 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951). All of these
cases involved plaintiffs accused of communist taint who had been uniformly unsuccessful
in the courts. See text accompanying notes 110-15 supra. See also Perez v. Curran, N.Y.
Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, April 4, 1957 (expelled for admittedly stabbing a crewmate).
264. The only two exceptions found were cases in which plaintiff won at trial after
losing motion for temporary injunction are Reubal v. Lewis, 182 Misc. 30, 43 N.Y.S.2d
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Experience would suggest that courts should err on the side of liberality
in granting temporary injunctions in discipline cases. Interim protection of
the disciplined member normally places no substantial hardship on the union,
for it only delays the impact of the penalty; but lack of protection may serious-
ly injure the member, depriving him of his rights of participation in the demo-
cratic process in the union or even his livelihood. Madden v. Atkins 265
dramatically demonstrates the danger not only to the individual, but also to
the union and to the courts themselves of the denial of interim relief. The
leaders of the opposition party were expelled in the spring of 1953, and after
some futile efforts to appeal moved for a temporary injunction in October,
1953. This was denied one month later, and the denial was affirmed in Janu-
ary, 1954, three months after the suit was begun. Obtaining a decision after
trial, again unfavorable, took 18 more months, and the plaintiffs who had
been out of work for two years were faced with raising money to print the
voluminous record for appeal. This caused additional delay, and it was not
until May, 1957, that a reversal was obtained in the appellate division and
they were ordered reinstated. During the four intervening years the oppo-
sition group in the union was strangled and the ruling clique held unchallenged
control. In addition, the union was saddled with a monumental financial lia-
bility, and the courts were burdened for two more years with a multiplicity
of complex proceedings to determine the amount of the damages and to collect
them. Hindsight makes doubly clear that the interests of both parties and
the interests of the court would have been served by granting a temporary
injunction at the outset.2'6 A plaintiff's temptation to abuse this remedy by
deliberate delay in pressing his suit can be curbed by the court's continuing
power to revoke the injunction.
In over half of the cases the plaintiff does not even seek interim relief, and
relief is then necessarily postponed until after trial.267 The very failure to seek
a temporary injunction removes the badge of urgency, obtaining preference
for trial becomes more difficult, and the court feels no need for speed. 26 8 The
540 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (temporary injunction denied), 47 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
(reinstatement and damages granted) ; Watson v. Victory, 29 L.R.R.M. 2354 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1952) (temporary injunction denied), N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, April 15, 1952
(reinstatement granted).
265. 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
266. Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959), has some-
what the same history. The plaintiffs moved for a temporary injunction, but after seven
months this was denied, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Onondago County, Oct. 5, 1957. A year after
suit was begun, the case was tried and plaintiffs were denied relief, and thirteen months
later the appellate division ordered reinstatement and then remanded the case for trial
on the question of damages.
267. In the average discipline case, getting a case to trial takes more than a year.
However, a substantial number may never reach trial but are effectively disposed of on
motions to the pleadings or are settled by the parties.
268. In Lafferty v. Fremd, Aurelio, J., N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, March 1, 1955.
the plaintiff sought and obtained a temporary injunction, this was appealed and affirmed,
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reason for failure to seek interim relief is not clear, but apparently many
lawyers are so misled by judicial language as to the extraordinary character
of such relief that they mistakenly consider the request futile.
Complete litigation of these cases is time consuming, but exceptional cases
such as Madden v. Atkins create an exaggerated impression of delay. In half
of the discipline cases studied, the last legal step, including appeals, was com-
pleted within six months of the commencement of the suit. Less than one-
fourth took more than two years.
Some instances of delay seem inexcusable. One judge delayed five months,
and another seven, in deciding motions for temporary injunctions, 20 9 although
many such motions are disposed of in a matter of days. In several cases,
appeals to the appellate division took from one to two years, while some were
handled in less than six months. Responsibility for delay does not rest solely
on the courts or on the union lawyer's use of dilatory tactics. A substantial
portion rests on the disciplined member and his lawyer. In one case the plain-
tiff seemed hesitant to go to trial for two years, 270 and in another the plain-
tiff's lawyer refused to move for trial, causing a three year delay before he
was removed.2 71 The fact that litigation is often used as a political instrument
in a factional fight may lead to delaying tactics, first by one side and then the
other, to get the maximum political advantage.
Study of the cases suggests that delay in judicial proceedings is not an
insuperable obstacle to effective legal remedies. By giving interim relief courts
can and do give the disciplined member substantial protection against the
inevitable slowness of litigation. Furthermore, the equitable proceedings
through which these cases are handled normally move relatively rapidly
through the courts, even in those areas where delays in jury trials are notor-
ious.
3. Costs of Litigation
The danger that the legal rights of a disciplined member will go by default
because of the cost of asserting them in court is obvious, but the source and
size of that danger is not so apparent.
tried and the injunction made permanent, 36 L.R.R.M. 2674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955), all
within eight months of the beginning of the suit. In Watson v. Victory, 29 L.R.R.M.
2354 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952), the court denied a temporary injunction, set the case for an
early trial, and after trial ordered reinstatement, all within four months of the beginning
of the suit, Watson v. Victory, Walter, 3., N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, April 15, 1952.
269. See Dakehohylous v. Ernst, 203 Misc. 277, 118 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1952);
Fittipaldi v. Legassie, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Onondaga County, Oct. 5, 1957.
270. Cromwell v. Morrin, 91 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1949). The fact noted in the
text, not contained in the opinion, was derived from discussions with principal parties
in the case.
271. Gleeson v. Conrad, 276 App. Div. 861, 93 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1949). The fact noted
in the text, not contained in the reported opinion, was derived from discussions with
principal participants in the case,
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The most critical factor is the inequality of the resources of the parties. The
plaintiffs are wage earners who must finance the litigation out of small savings
and current income. If the court fails to protect the member's earning power
during the litigation, he is quickly left without any resources to continue the
fight. The union has available its treasury to finance costly procedural ma-
neuvers and extended appeals. If the disciplined member is given no interim
protection, the union has a double incentive to delay, complicate, and otherwise
protract the litigation. Due to the disparity of financial resources the legal
struggle is inherently unequal, but without interim protection, the individual
is nearly helpless.
The availability of the damage remedy is but small help. The plaintiff's
lawyer may continue the fight with the hope of ultimately winning an award
from which he can collect a fee, but the uncertainty of victory and the political
obstacles to collecting from the union treasury may make this a poor risk. 2
The plaintiff may be confronted with demands for cash outlay for transcripts,
printed records, and briefs. His anticipated damage award is seldom useful
collateral to finance these outlays.- 3
These obstacles are nearly insuperable when a lone individual is pitted
against the union. Most of the litigated cases, however, are not of this type,
but are in fact part of a factional fight. The plaintiff is, for practical purposes,
not an individual but an opposition group.
When the litigation is sponsored by a faction or group, the problem of costs
is significantly altered. First, the group can raise money. Contributions are
commonly solicited, and the group may even create a formal organization with
dues. Although it cannot match the resources of the union, it can usually
obtain enough money for necessary expenses.2 4 In a number of cases oppo-
sition groups have demonstrated their ability to carry through extended litiga-
tion. Second, obtaining legal services becomes much easier. The plaintiffs'
lawyer knows that if the opposition group wins control of the union he will
272. The courts have uniformly refused to award lawyers fees. Polin v. Kaplan, 257
N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931); Metzler v. Conrad, 276 App. Div. 861, 93 N.Y.S.2d 670
(1949). Even where suit was brought against those who had maliciously instigated the
expulsion proceedings, the plaintiff's verdict for recovery of attorney's fees was upset on
the grounds that some of the money had been donated by other members of the union
and the plaintiff failed to show how much he was obligated to repay. Coleman v. Engel-
king, 272 App. Div. 805, 70 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1947).
273. The cost of appeal is often prohibitive, especially if it is after a trial. Obtaining
a transcript and printing the record can cost not only hundreds, but thousands of dollars.
This requires cash, not a self-sacrificing or optimistic lawyer. Because of these costs, the
outcome in the trial is crucial. If the plaintiffs win, the costs fall on the appealing union.
274. Even for a substantial organized group, costs of appeal can create severe
difficulties. In Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958),
the filing of the appeal was delayed nearly a year while the plaintiffs sought to raise the
funds necessary to obtain the transcript and print the record. The fact that the appellate
divisions ultimately awarded costs, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1957), assessed
at $3,338 by the trial court, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, July 3, 1957, did not give the
plaintiffs cash when it was critically needed,
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almost certainly become the union's counsel. This is a contingency worth his
time and effort. Even if the group does not win control, his representing the
group gives the lawyer an opportunity to make himself known to each member
of the group, demonstrate his ability, and act as friend and champion. This
widens his circle of potential clients for negligence, divorce, and other general
practice.275
This study, including interviews with lawyers, indicates that the problem
of costs is predominantly one of the isolated individual. Yet, if there is an active
opposition group within the union, even he may gain protection, for any sub-
stantial injustice will be seized by the opposition as political ammunition. The
group then provides the financial base for carrying through the litigation.
The very fact that so few cases involve individuals unsupported by factional
groups suggests that the lone member's rights go by default, and many lawyers
frankly admitted that they would not take a case unless it was backed by a
substantial group.276
The extent to which individuals and small groups have been able to enforce
their rights in court is a tribute to those lawyers who, fired by a sense of
injustice, have contributed unlimited time and energy with no anticipation of
even meagre compensation. The burden falls heavily on the lawyer who
fulfills his professional responsibility, but even that sacrifice is often inadequate.
CONCLUSION
Judicial doctrines do not decide concrete discipline cases-this is apparent
from the face of the published opinions. The contract theory which purports
to confine the court to applying the union constitution is at most a rough guide,
for ambiguous and incomplete discipline provisions leave courts free to draw
their own boundaries. The exhaustion of remedies rule, disarmed by multiple
exceptions, is little more than an admonition against judicial haste. The
threadbare cloak of language in the opinions cannot conceal that these doc-
trines do not bind the court, nor do they explain the decisions.
Close study of the cases, and particularly examination of all of the facts
before the judge, emphasizes not only the emptiness of the doctrines, but a
275. The lawyer's willingness to take these cases for the purpose of obtaining clients
in nonlabor cases plays a far greater role in internal union litigation than is commonly
recognized. Members of railroad or seamen's unions have less difficulty in obtaining
counsel than members of other unions because their claims for work injuries are not
restricted by workmen's compensation and hold promise of substantial contingent fees.
The lawyer who handled two cases involving lone individuals indicated that he took the
cases because the individuals whom he represented had personal injury claims which
assured the lawyer that his fee for the discipline case would be paid.
276. If the real defendant is the international, even a large group within the local is
faced with the greatest difficulties. Lawyers for the international need spare no expense,
delay, or diversionary tactic, and these may be supplemented by imposing a trusteeship
on the local and thereby vastly enlarging the litigation as well as frustrating the opposi-
tion in gaining control.
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willingness of the New York courts to create a body of law regulating union
discipline. The pattern which emerges contains at least five marked elements,
which at times coalesce and at times clash. First, a recognition of the value of
union membership as a right to participate in union affairs, wholly apart from
its importance in obtaining employment. Second, a strong concern for protect-
ing free play of the democratic process in the political life of the union, includ-
ing virulent criticism of union officers and organized opposition groups within
the union. Third, an overriding hostility to communists or communist tainted
factions within the union. Fourth, a stern insistence on the essential elements
of procedural due process in union trials, including freedom of union tribunals
from discernable bias. Fifth, a limited confidence in union appellate procedures
and small reluctance to delay intervention while they work their way. These
are the principal elements which, applied to the facts actually before the court,
guide the decision.
This pattern, though clearly discernible, is neither boldly nor cleanly etched.
Incantation of traditional doctrines dominates judicial opinions, even though
the premises of those doctrines are contradicted by the pattern pricked by the
decisions. Random cases violate the pattern, for unperceptive judges are
deceived by language which obscures the result, and these vagrant decisions
in turn blur the prevailing pattern. The insistence on procedural due process
has not been disguised by doctrine, but has been boldly declared by the courts.
In this area the lines have been drawn in greater detail and followed with
greater consistency. Protecting political freedoms within the union has long
been achieved by manipulating the contract theory, and this subterfuse has led
to uneven protection. Madden v. Atkins, however, has now stripped away the
veil of language and forthrightly protected these rights. Judges can now see
clearly their responsibility and face squarely the difficult task of marking out
the details. The degree of deference given to union appellate tribunals is
almost wholly obscured by the consuming exceptions to the exhaustion rule,
and it is here that the results have been most erratic.
The active role assumed by the courts in protecting individual rights and
democratic processes within the union raises inevitably the critical question of
the courts' competence to fill this role. This study provides no definitive
answer, but close examination of what courts do, in contrast to what they say,
tends strongly to dispel many doubts.
First, the court can and does obtain a full picture of the facts, including the
underlying internal union conflict which gave rise to the discipline. Affidavits
supporting motions for an injunction paint the picture in vivid terms, lawyers'
arguments on those motions emphasize the facts rather than the law, and the
nonjury trials are not, in practice, inhibited by restrictive rules of evidence.
The judicial process thus permits, if not encourages, full development of
the facts.
Second, many judges have shown substantial competence in understanding
the internal workings of unions. Some of the most puzzling cases reveal, upon
closer scrutiny of the full factual picture, remarkable judicial insight. Disci-
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pline cases grow largely out of contests for political power, and the judge's
own political experience often develops in him a special sensitivity to the prob-
lems involved. He knows the devices available, can see through disguised
manipulation, and understands the needs for protection. The political process
is in his area of expertness.
Third, judicial remedies are as effective as any the law knows. Temporary
injunctions can be obtained without delay, even in a matter of hours where
necessary. With interim protection, delay in trials and appeals becomes rela-
tively unimportant. The cases examined show that judicial remedies are in fact
much faster than most administrative remedies. The critical factor in judicial
remedies is the willingness of the court to give interim protection with a
temporary injunction, and at this point most courts have not displayed undue
caution. The one inherent weakness is the cost of litigation and this becomes
a serious problem for the isolated individual who can find no faction to cham-
pion his cause.
This study has focused solely on the handling of union discipline cases in
the New York courts, and the conclusions drawn here may not be entirely
valid in other states. The New York cases, however, are of first importance
for they represent almost half of the reported opinions, and New York has
historically provided many of the leading cases in the area of internal union
affairs. The courts of other states have used the same doctrinal logic and
have at times transparently manipulated it in the same way to reach the many
of the same results. A similar study in other states might well reveal similar
variance between the language of published opinions and actual disposition of
the cases.
The willingness of New York courts to intervene in unions is not rooted
in any special judicial hostility to unions. On the contrary, the legal climate
in New York has long been relatively favorable to unions, and unions wield
considerable political power even in the selection of judges. The study does
not show that judges in highly unionized areas are more reluctant to intervene
in internal union disputes than judges in nonunion areas, or that there is any
parallel between willingness to issue labor injunctions and the willingness to
enjoin union discipline.
New York is unusual only in the amount of experience which its judges
have had in internal union cases-probably more than judges in any other
state. Moreover, this is heavily concentrated, for over half of all the cases in
the entire state are handled by the Supreme Court of Manhattan County. The
judges of this court have had an opportunity to acquire a special expertise.
Insofar as this concentration of experience affects the overall pattern, it may
give added weight to the New York cases as guides to other states and to
the federal courts who must give body and vigor to the skeletal provisions of
the federal statute.
